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ECOLE  NORMALE  SUPERIEURE,  CEPREMAP  AND CEPR 
The  Debt  Crisis:  A  Postmortem* 
1. Introduction 
"Crisis," in Greek, means  decision. From that etymologic  view,  the debt 
crisis of the 1980s was  not really a "crisis." No  country overtly chose  to 
repudiate  its debt-those,  like Brazil, that went  toward  doing  it came 
back on their decision-and  no creditor really decided  to wage  a "war" 
against  bad  debtors.  Instead,  the  crisis  has  been  lingering  from  one 
rescheduling  to the  next,  with  no  obvious  "final settlement"  in  sight. 
This feature, however,  does  not make the 1980s unique.  As the compre- 
hensive  work by Eichengreen  and  Portes  (1986, 1989) (henceforth,  EP) 
has  shown,  the  1980s share with  the  1930s the  same  protracted nature 
and  the  same  failed  attempts  to  find  a resolution.  As  I will  show  in 
Section  2,  it also  shares  with  the  1930s another  important  feature: De- 
spite arrears and reschedulings,  the creditors did manage  to recover an 
important part of their claims.  (I will attempt  to explain why  in Section 
2.3.)  Taking  as  a liquidative  value  the  secondary  market  price  of  the 
debt, I will show  that all major debtors (except Brazil) delivered  a market 
return to the commercial banks.  EP found  the same feature for the U.K. 
bonds  in the  1930s. 
Yet, the  debt crisis of the  1930s ended  a decade  later, with  a negoti- 
ated  settlement.  A  specific  event,  World  War  II, it  is  true,  sped  up 
settlements  as  the  governments  of  the  key  creditors  countries  (the 
United Kingdom  and the United  States) attempted  to find or to preserve 
alliances with  the debtor countries.  But more fundamentally,  the build- 
ing up of arrears motivated  private  creditors  to seek  an agreement.  To 
what  extent  can we  expect  a similar unfolding  of the  debt crisis of the 
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1980s? Should  we  expect  the  1990s to bring  the  final  settlements  that 
the 1940s have  brought? 
Because  the  1990s  are  apparently  speeding  up  disarmament  rather 
than  war,  one  should  not  expect  the  process  to  repeat  itself  term  for 
term  ....  Yet the building  up  of arrears has  certainly  started,  and  the 
Brady speech,  in disconnecting  the accumulation  of interest arrears from 
the  signature  of an IMF agreement,  has  made  each  of them  easier.  In 
1985, arrears were less  than $10 billion; they soared in 1990 to about $50 
billion (see World Debt Tables,  1991). At the same time,  the Brady deal 
pointed  to a shift  in the  priorities  of the  U.S.  government  (the French 
and the British governments  having  started, for their part, a competition 
of  their  own  on  who  will  offer  the  most  favorable  terms  to  the  low- 
income  debtors).  Will the  1990s be  the  decade  of the  grand  settlement 
and-as  Eichengreen  and Lindert (1989) have ironically suggested-will 
it be the decade  that will open  the way  to a new  wave  of debt accumu- 
lation? 
How  far off a settlement  do we  stand,  and what  lessons  of the debt 
crisis should  we draw before the next debt buildup  starts: These are the 
two  questions  that I will attempt  to address  in this paper. 
1.1 TOWARD  A GRAND SETTLEMENT? 
In 1943, Brazil offered  its  creditors  two  ways  out.  One  option  offered 
no reduction  of principal  but an interest  rate cut from 6.5 to 3.4%; an- 
other option  offered a cash payment  of about 10% of the face value and 
a principal and an interest  cut on the rest (see Cardoso and Dornbusch, 
1989). On July 23, 1989, Mexico and its creditors agreed  on a debt relief 
plan  offering  the  banks  three  options:  (1) reduce  the  face value  of the 
debt by 35%, (2) reduce  the interest  rate to 6.25%, or (3) keep  the face 
value  and  the  interest  rates unchanged  but lend  an additional  25% of 
the  face value  in  the  next  3 years.  Eventually,  (on  February 4,  1990), 
46.9% of  the  creditors  have  chosen  the  par bond,  40.2% the  discount 
bond,  and  13.1% the  third option.  The parallel between  the  two  deals 
is striking.  Already,  Venezuela,  the  Philippines,  Costa  Rica, and  Uru- 
guay have signed  a debt reduction  agreement  with their creditors. Nige- 
ria is about  to,  and  Argentina  and  Brazil are also expected  to sign  one 
sooner  or later. 
Does  that make  the  Brady deal  the  vehicle  of a forthcoming  "grand 
settlement"?  It takes a long  detour  to answer  this question  because  the 
Brady  deal  (in  contrast  to  the  deals  that  were  signed  in  the  1940s) 
amounts  to having  the debtor borrow from International Financial Insti- 
tutions  (IFIs) such  as  the  World  Bank or the  IMF in  order  to  finance 
their debt reduction  program with  the private creditors.  If one assumes 
that the commercial banks stay neutral,  the deal is bound  to create later The  Debt  Crisis:  A Postmortem  *  67 
conflicts  between  the  country  and  the  IFIs. I will  argue  that it would 
have  been  more  appropriate  to  give  the  debtor  countries,  say,  3 or 5 
years to accumulate  reserves  with  which  they  could  have  repurchased 
their  debt-at  a price  agreed upon ex ante. As  I will  show  empirically 
(building  on  Bulow  and  Rogoff's  key  distinction  between  average  and 
marginal price),  few  resources  are required  to repurchase,  say,  half the 
debt of a typical middle-income  debtor-provided  that the price appro- 
priately reflects the marginal value  of writing  down  the debt. 
1.2 LESSONS  FOR  THE  FUTURE 
If a settlement  of the debt crisis actually happens,  it is unlikely  to be on 
the  grounds  that  this  will  help  to  deliver  a  more  efficient  outcome. 
Rather,  it is  likely  to  reflect  a change  in  the  bargaining  power  of  the 
parties involved.  However,  the following  question  is clearly important: 
How  much  additional  growth  should  we  expect  an easing  of the  debt 
burden  to deliver? Similarly,  how  much  of the  slowdown  of growth  in 
the 1980s can be assigned  to debt? I make (in the first part of section  3) 
an attempt  to address  this  question  empirically.  I will  show  that-out 
of an extraordinary reduction  of 4.9%-about  half of the growth  slow- 
down  of the large debtors is a world  wide  phenomenon,  0.8% is due to 
the  decline  in  their  terms  of  trade,  0.5% is  due  to  lower  investment, 
and "only"  0.9% remains  as an "unexplained"  productivity  slowdown 
that the debt crisis may have caused.  Although  this number may appear 
to be small,  I will  nevertheless  make  the  point  that it is of an order of 
magnitude  that is well  above  the real cost of writing  down  the debt by, 
say,  half,  as I suggested  earlier. 
More broadly,  one  would  like  to  go  beyond  the  specific  pattern  of 
growth  during  the  1980s and  use  the  past two  decades  to evaluate  the 
capacity of foreign  finance  to enhance  the prospect  of growth  in a poor 
country.  Should  we  think that sovereign  risk and the risk of default are 
the prime reasons  why  access  to the  world  financial markets  does  not 
appear  to  help  substantially  the  developing  countries,  or  should  we 
think  instead  that  it is  the  low  returns  to  capital  accumulation  in  the 
poor  countries  that  explain  why  they  could  not  take advantage  of the 
world financial markets to grow faster (as argued in Lucas, 1990)? These 
are the questions  that-very  broadly-I  will address  in the last part of 
this paper. 
2. Paying  and Cancelling  the Debt 
2.1 HOW MUCH DID THE  LARGE  DEBTORS  PAY IN THE 1980s? 
One  of  the  key  (perhaps  surprising)  results  that is  obtained  from  the 
analysis  of the 1930s is that the returns on the foreign bonds  were  often 68 *COHEN 
positive  and, in a few cases,  not far off the market return. In this section, 
I will  first analyze  the  returns  so  far obtained  by  the  creditors  in  the 
1980s. 
2.1.1  A Subsample  of 20 Countries  Of about $1,220 billion  of total debt, 
$950 billion  may be characterized  as  "at some  risk," and  about 65% of 
this $950 billion  is owed  by just 20 countries.  It is on  this narrow  sub- 
group  that I will  first focus  the  analysis.  (I turn to the average  debtors 
later.) The 20 countries  are Algeria,  Argentina,  Brazil, Chile,  Colombia, 
Cote d'Ivoire,  Ecuador,  Egypt,  Hungary,  Indonesia,  Mexico,  Morocco, 
Nigeria,  Pakistan,  Peru,  Philippines,  Sudan,  Turkey,  Venezuela,  and 
Zaire. (We also wanted  to include  Yugoslavia  and  Poland,  but we  had 
data problems  with  these  countries.)  Table 1 shows  the  1980 and  1982 
debt-to-export  and  debt-to-GDP  ratios.  It is  extraordinary  to  note  the 
formidable  jump  of these  debt  ratios in only  2 years.  This jump  is the 
result  of  the  interest-rate  shock  together  with  the  acute  recession  in 
Table 1  TWENTY  REPRESENTATIVE  DEBTORS 
Second- 
ary mar- 
Debt-to-export  ratio  Debt-to-GDP  ratio  Total  ket 
debt  price 
1980  1982  1989  1980  1982  1989  1989  1989 
Algeria  130.6  119.2  248.8  47.1  40.4  57.6  26.1  0.76 
Argentina  242.4  447.3  537.0  48.4  83.8  129.7  64.7  0.18 
Brazil  304.8  395.4  301.6  30.6  36.1  24.1  11.3  0.28 
Mexico  259.2  311.5  262.9  30.3  52.5  51.2  95.6  0.41 
Nigeria  32.2  100.4  390.1  9.0  14.1  119.3  32.8  0.27 
Venezuela  131.9  159.8  211.5  42.1  41.4  79.9  33.1  0.40 
Colombia  117.1  204.3  220.8  20.9  26.9  45.8  16.9  0.63 
Chile  192.5  335.9  187.7  45.2  76.7  78.3  18.2  0.61 
Ecuador  201.6  281.3  392.3  53.8  66.9  112.9  11.3  0.16 
Hungary  95.9  158.7  44.8  45.4  75.8  20.6  0.99 
Indonesia  94.2  123.6  210.6  28.0  29.2  59.8  53.1 
Morocco  223.8  326.9  328.6  53.1  84.0  95.9  20.9  0.45 
Philippines  212.5  297.7  226.4  49.5  62.5  65.7  28.9  0.49 
Turkey  332.9  195.8  189.8  34.3  38.2  53.8  41.6  0.93 
Zaire  202.2  296.2  370.1  33.5  35.7  96.6  8.8  0.19 
Ivory Coast  180.7  276.5  463.9  58.8  111.4  182.2  15.4  0.06 
Egypt  208.4  277.8  355.3  95.0  120.9  159.0  48.8  0.39 
Pakistan  196.9  215.0  242.6  42.5  38.3  46.9  18.5 
Peru  207.7  294.0  432.2  51.0  49.7  70.8  19.9  0.05 
Sudan  499.3  699.3  1051.2  65.7  101.4  82.9  13.0  0.015 The  Debt  Crisis:  A Postmortem  *  69 
the OECD. In order to offset  what  they  viewed  (or perhaps  pretended 
to  view)  as  a  temporary  phenomenon,  these  already  quite  indebted 
countries  skyrocketed  their  debt  to levels  that were  to become  unsus- 
tainable in the economic  environment  of the  1980s. 
2.1.2  How Much Did They Pay?  In order to get  summary  measures  of 
the amount  of resources  that have been  transferred by the debtor to the 
creditors, call Pt the payments  that have been  transferred (in net terms) 
by the debtors  to the  creditors.  These  payments  are minus the  transfers 
reported in the World Debt Table (see the working  paper version  of this 
paper-available  on request-for  an introduction  to these  data and for 
a discussion  of their critique by Lindert,  1989). We have  calculated: 
T 
v=  Pt  vO 
= 
+  t  (1) 
t=l  -  (1  +  is) 
s=l 
in  which  t  =  0 is  1982,  T is  1989,  and  is is  the  LIBOR at time  s.  The 
calculation  yields  V0, the  present  value  of all transfers  that have  been 
made  by  the  debtors  to their creditors.  If the  interest  rate on  the  debt 
were  exactly equal to LIBOR, one  would  have: 
Do-  t 
t  -  Vo  (2) 
R (1 +  is) 
s=l 
and V0  would  exactly measure  the reduction  of the debt (in present value 
terms)  that  the  payments  Pt would  have  brought.  The  discrepancies 
arise because  of  measurement  problems  (which  are addressed  in  our 
working  paper)  and  because  a spread  over  LIBOR was  charged  to the 
debtors. 
We first present  for each country  a key indicator that reveals best the 
extent to which  the debt was  actually serviced.  It is the ratio Vo/Do that 
measures  the share of the initial debt that has been  repaid  (in net terms) 
over  the  years  1982-1989.  The  results  are in  Table 2.  We  distinguish 
three groups of countries.  Countries  in Group A transferred, in the aggre- 
gate, a significant  amount  of resources  to  their  creditors.  Countries  in 
Group B essentially  stayed  at financial autarky and neither reduced  nor 
increased (in present value terms) their total exposure.  Finally, countries 
in Group C became  increasingly  indebted. 70  COHEN 
An extraordinary feature of Table 2 is how  well  the commercial banks 
have  done.  In 11 out  of 20 cases,  they  managed  to recover  more  than 
40% of  their  initial  exposure  in  only  7 years.  Even  in  Group  C,  they 
managed  to recapture  in three  out  of five  countries  more  than  35% of 
their claims. 
We  also  see  that  the  six  countries  in  Group  A  repaid  a  significant 
amount  (more than 30%) of their total outstanding  debt.  In these  cases, 
it is not the  debt borrowed  from one  creditor that helped  pay the debt 
due  to another. 
Group B contains  a subsample  of countries  that essentially  stayed  in 
financial autarky.  In that group,  Chile,  Ecuador,  Hungary,  Indonesia, 
and  Morocco  serviced  a large  part of their  commercial  debt  using  the 
IFI's money  to repay their commercial creditors.  Except for Morocco,  all 
of  these  countries,  along  with  Turkey,  were  perceived  as  good  risks, 
and their secondary  market price showed  a small discount. 
Let us focus  for the moment  on the countries  in Group A,  for which 
Table  2  PERCENTAGE  OF 1982 LONG-TERM  DEBT  PAID IN 1983-1989 
Present  value  calculations 
Total debt  Commercial  debt 
Group A 
Algeria  0.31  0.46 
Argentina  0.40  0.62 
Brazil  0.38  0.29 
Mexico  0.62  0.48 
Nigeria  0.30  0.91 
Venezuela  0.75  0.77 
Group B 
Colombia  0.015  0.19 
Chile  0.18  0.35 
Ecuador  0.12  0.56 
Hungary  0.06  0.54 
Indonesia  -  0.025  0.28 
Morocco  0.009  0.52 
Philippines  0.17  0.66 
Turkey  0.09  0.24 
Zaire  -0.03  0.25 
Group C 
Ivory Coast  -0.06  0.40 
Egypt  -0.14  0.35 
Pakistan  -0.09  0.56 
Peru  -0.16  0.30 
Sudan  -0.16  0.06 The  Debt  Crisis:  A Postmortem  ?  71 
Table  3  DEBT  REPAID  IN 1983-1989 WHEN TAKING  ACCOUNT  OF 
LIQUIDATION  VALUE  (1989  PRICES)  AS A FRACTION 
OF 1982 DEBT 
Total  debt  Commercial  debt 
Algeria  1.13  0.98 
Argentina  0.82  1.02 
Brazil  0.47  0.51 
Mexico  0.79  0.78 
Nigeria  1.37  1.13 
Venezuela  1.15  1.24 
a substantial  amount  of  net  repayments  have  been  made.  In order to 
get a more comprehensive  assessment  of the return on debt,  let us also 
take account  of the  liquidating  value  of the  debt in 1989, such  as mea- 
sured  by  the  secondary  market price at the  end  of  1989 (which  was  a 
low  point  for the market).  One  gets  Table 3. 
With  these  liquidation  values,  one  now  sees  that  all  countries  in 
Group A,  except  Brazil, would  have  essentially  repaid  all their debt  if 
it had been  liquidated  at 1989 prices.  The same  conclusion  would  have 
been  reached  with  the five  "good-risk"  countries  in Group B. 
Let us  now  analyze  the  subgroup  of all middle-income  severely  in- 
debted countries  such as defined  by the World Debt Tables (1990). (They 
consist  of  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile,  Congo,  Costa  Rica,  Cote 
d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Egypt,  Honduras,  Hungary,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Nica- 
ragua,  Peru,  Philippines,  Poland,  Senegal,  Uruguay,  and  Venezuela.) 
One  gets  the  results  that are shown  in Table 4.  On  average,  one  sees 
that the creditors as a whole  would  have recaptured 58% of their claims 
if the debt had been  liquidated  at its 1989 value. 
By the end  of 1989, the group of middle-income  debtors was  then,  so 
to speak,  40% off solvency.  On the other hand,  from the end  of 1980 to 
Table  4  DEBT  REPAID  IN 1983-1989 AS A FRACTION  OF 1982  DEBT  BY 
THE  SEVERELY  INDEBTED  MIDDLE-INCOME  COUNTRIES 
Present  value  of  PVNT + 1989 
net transfers  liquidation 
(PVNT)  value 
Aggregate debt  0.27  0.58 
Debt due to 
commercial  banks  0.45  0.77 72  COHEN 
the end of 1982, the debt of this subgroup  jumped  by 41%. This shows 
that the 1980 level  of indebtedness  would  have been just right! (In 1981 
and  1982 alone,  the  severely  indebted  middle-income  countries  bor- 
rowed  in net terms an extra $81 billion of long-term  debt-out  of a 1980 
level of $212 billion-67%  of which  was used  to meet  the rising interest 
bill.) On the other hand,  low-income  debtors  did not generate  positive 
transfers,  but their aggregate  debt is "only"  25% of the total. 
2.1.3  Why Did They Pay?  Every year,  the  group  of  severely  indebted 
middle-income  countries  transferred to its creditors about 3% of its GDP 
(i.e.,  about  14% of its exports).  This number  gives  an indirect measure 
of the losses  that the debtors  have  feared they  would  suffer otherwise. 
What is  the  nature  of  these  losses?  To what  extent  are they  likely  to 
shift  over  time?  Here  again,  the  1930s  offer  an  interesting  reference. 
There  was,  at  the  time,  no  clear  evidence  of  major  trade  sanctions 
against defaulting  debtor countries.  Also,  trade credits were as much an 
issue  of concern  for the  debtor  countries  as they  have  been  today.  At 
the  time,  however,  banks were  in  the  (profitable)  business  of  offering 
trade credit (while  bondholders,  a separate  group,  were  attempting  to 
recapture their claims): "On several  occasions,  the representative  of the 
bankers reaffirmed  that they  were  unable  to associate  themselves  with 
any attempt of the Council  (of the Bondholders)  to oppose  export credit 
to a defaulting  country"  (EP, 1989). For their part, the  indebted  coun- 
tries did everything  they could to continue  their service of their commer- 
cial debts.  This is a key  point  to which  we  shall return later. 
Reputation, on  the  other hand,  was  not, it seems,  a prime motive  for 
sustaining  debt  service  (cf.  Bulow  and  Rogoff,  1989,  for a theoretical 
explanation).  All  Latin  American  countries-whether  they  serviced 
their debt,  as Argentina  faithfully  did,  or not-lost  their access  to for- 
eign  finance  in the  1930s. No  reward  was  granted  to the  good  debtor. 
Actually,  as  EP have  shown,  those  countries  that  defaulted  early  on 
appear  to  have  experienced  higher  growth  than  the  others.  After  the 
war, although  the issue  is less  unambiguous,  it does  not seem  that the 
good  debtors enjoyed  significantly  better terms of credit than the others 
(see  Jorgensen  and  Sachs,  1989; Lindert  and  Morton,  1989,  and  the 
dissenting  view  of Ozler,  forthcoming). 
Let us  stick here  to the  idea  that  the  fear of losing  trade credit lines 
(and not  trade  opportunities)  is  the  main  reason  why  the  debtors  are 
willing  to avoid  outright  default.  In order to get  an empirical view  on 
this issue,  let us first briefly set up a benchmark out of which  the depen- 
dency  of the  service  of the  debt  on  the cost  of debt repudiation  can be 
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Assume  that a country produces  an output,  Qt (the numeraire),  which 
it (partially) consumes  domestically  and otherwise  sells  abroad. 
Call Xt the volume  of exports  and C2(t) the domestic  consumption  of 
the numeraire; one  can write: 
Qt =  Xt +  C2(t). 
In exchange  for its  exports,  the  country  can  purchase  at a price  Pt 
some  imported  goods  and can repay an amount  Rt of its debt. 
Call Cl(t) the (domestic)  consumption  of the imported  good.  One can 
write: 
Xt =  ptCl(t) + Rt. 
Putting together  the two  previous  identities,  one  can write: 
ptC1(t)  +  C2(t) =  Qt-  Rt. 
We shall refer to financial  autarky  (or simply  "autarky") as the  case 
when  Rt =  0. 
Let us  assume  that  the  utility  of  the  country  at  any  time  t can  be 
measured  through  an additively  separable  utility function: 
Vt P=St)u(cs)  with u(C) =  ,  1,  (3) 
s=t  ' 
in which  C  =  C"Cl-a is a Cobb-Douglas  function  of the volume  C1 of 
the imported  good  and C2 of the domestic  good.  Up to a multiplicative 
constant  at(1  -  a)l-1,  which  we  ignore  without  loss  in what  follows, 
one  can then  write  that the  optimal  choice  of  Ct (when  Rt is taken  as 
given)  is  Ct =  pt  -(Qt  -  Rt). For simplicity,  we  shall  assume  that the 
terms of trade of the  country  are a constant  Pt =  1, so that Ct =  Qt - 
Rt simply  measures  the  "aggregate"  consumption  that the country  has 
access  to when  it repays  Rt to its creditors. 
Assume  now  that  the  country,  if it were  to  default,  would  have  to 
pay  up  front  (rather than  at credit)  a fraction  x  -  1 of the  imports  it 
already purchased.  At the  time  t when  it defaults,  let us  consequently 
assume  that  the  country  must  pay  xaoQt  to  its  trade partners  in  order 
to  avoid  trade  disruption.  This  lump  sum  up-front  payment  is  to  be 
interpreted  as a way  to clear out  unpaid  trade credits  (proportional  to 
the amounts  of imports  Cl(t)  =  aQt). But let us also assume  that,  once 74  COHEN 
this one-shot  loss is paid,  the country has no further obligation  and can 
stay at financial autarky  (and consume  Ct =  Qt). The reservation  level 
of the country  can then  be written  as: 
oc 
Vt =  u[Qt(l  -  ctx)] +  (s-t)u(Qs).  (4) 
s=t+l 
Call Rt =  XtQt  the  fraction  of  its  resources  that  the  country  will  be 
required to pay to its creditors.  Rt must  be chosen  so that: 
Vt Vt  V  Vt. 
To  put  some  back  of  the  envelope  figures  behind  these  numbers, 
assume  first that y  =  0 (i.e.,  u(x)  =  Log x). 
In that case,  one  simply  gets  that, for any interval of time (a, a  +  1) 
during which  the credit ceiling  is binding: 
Z  (s-t)Log(l  -  Xs) =  Log(1  -  ax) 
s=t 
which  immediately  yields  that Xt  is a constant,  X, such  that: 
Log(1 -  X) =  (1 -  L)Log(1  -  ax).  (5) 
When,  say,  P  =  0.85,  o  =  0.3,  and  x  =  1/3  (which  corresponds  to 
paying  up front 4 months  of imports)  one finds  X =  1.5%. The number 
to be explained  is  X -  3% of GDP,  so we  solve  here  about  half of the 
problem. 
If instead  one  solves  a similar equation  when  y  =  -2  (which  corre- 
sponds  to  an  intertemporal  elasticity  of  substitution  of  1/3),  we  then 
have  to solve  (assuming  Q is constant): 
1  1-  ? 
- =r3 +  I  -  p  (6)  (1 -  X)2  (1 - ax)2  (6) 
With the  same  values  of  the  parameters  one  now  finds  X =  1.7%. So 
we're  going  toward  solving  (60% of)  the puzzle. 
These  calculations  leave  aside,  however,  all  bargaining  consider- 
ations.  But, perhaps  there  were  actually  none  to the extent  that credit 
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puts  the  country  in  no  situation  to bargain  (see  Cohen  1991a, Ch.  3). 
They  also  leave  aside  the  fact  that  investment  could  (dramatically) 
dampen  the  fluctuation  of  income  at  the  time  when  the  trade  credit 
lines are cut. From this perspective  it may be that-beyond  the one-shot 
loss-a  more  permanent risk  of  trade  disruption  is  also  there,  which 
induces  the country to not sever its links with  the financial community. 
At any rate, if one  trusts the credit line story-which  is the one  rou- 
tinely  repeated  when  the  issue  of  repayment  is  discussed-then  one 
sees how  vulnerable  the creditors might be. Indeed,  just as in the 1930s, 
trade credits are not exactly supplied  by the same creditors as those  that 
supplied  the rest of the debt.  So the risk of a panic is really what  drives 
trade creditors off in case of a debt crisis. If, say, the country could stay 
on good  terms with  the suppliers  of "credibility" (IMF and World Bank) 
while  defaulting  on its commercial  debt,  it may turn out that not servic- 
ing the commercial  debt would  become  harmless. 
Incidentally,  in the  models  that we  spelled  out  previously,  we  have 
shown  that  the  service  of  the  debt-when  the credit ceiling binds-was 
proportionate  to the  direct  sanctions  (x) that the  creditors  can impose 
on the country.  When there are no such costs,  that is when  the creditors 
can only  impose  financial autarky as a threat,  they  can recapture noth- 
ing  (again: when  the  credit ceiling  binds).  To see  the  generality  of the 
result,  consider  a continuous  time model  and take any interval  [a,b] on 
which  the credit ceiling  binds.  One  then  has: 
Vt E [a,b]  e-8(s-t)u(C,)ds =  f e--t)u(Qs)ds. 
If one assumes  (importantly)  that Qs is continuous  one can differenti- 
ate both  sides  and  find  u(Ct) =  u(Qt), that is,  Qt =  Ct and  get  the  no 
net transfers result.  This no transfer result should  not be taken to imply 
that no  credit is  feasible  when  only  financial  autarky is  available  as  a 
threat. Take for instance  the case when  u(.) satisfies the Inada condition, 
and  assume  that  Qt goes-repeatedly-through  zero  values  for some 
positive  amount  of time.  (I borrow this idea from the very useful  survey 
by  Eaton,  1991.) Then,  surely,  the  country  will  never  want  to  default 
and be relegated  to financial  autarky.  But, in this case,  the  repayment 
of  the  debt  will  be  voluntary: it will  not  take  place  during  an  episode 
when  the credit ceiling  binds. 
2.2 THE  SECONDARY  MARKET  AND THE PRICE  OF THE  DEBT 
Debt repurchases  played  an important  role in the  solution  of the  debt 
crisis  of  the  1930s.  Secondary  markets  (or  at  least  secondary  market 76  COHEN 
pricing) have now become, once again, the core of many proposals to 
end the debt crisis (and, indeed, they are already  a key part  of the Brady 
plan). We now review briefly the potential role of secondary market 
pricing as discussed in the recent literature  and highlight the criticism 
of this role by Bulow and Rogoff (1991) and Dooley (1988). We then 
present empirical evidence which opens the route to an analysis (in 
Section 3) of the negotiated settlements under way with the Brady  plan. 
2.2.1 A Theoretical  Background:  Marginal  and  Average  Prices  To set up the 
ideas in an explicit model, consider a simple two-period model of a 
country that owes a debt at time t = 2. Assume that the country always 
has the option of repudiating its debt, and also assume that the banks 
can (credibly)  impose-in  retaliation-a  sanction that amounts to a frac- 
tion XQ of the country's income. Finally, assume that the banks can 
always get the country to pay that fraction XQ  that the country would 
forego by defaulting. Call dF(Q)  the density of the (random)  distribution 
of the country's income. Let us take the banks to be risk-neutral  and 
(for simplicity of notation) take the riskless rate to be nil. One can write 
the market  value of a debt whose contractual  value is D as: 
DIX 
V(D)  =  Jf  QdF(Q)  +  DdF(Q)  . 
_  O  DI/  _ 
The first term in brackets represents how much the banks can get 
when the income of the country is so low that the country would rather 
default than service the debt fully (XQ  -  D). The second term measures 
the expected payments that accrue to the banks when the country hon- 
ors the contractual  value of the debt (an event that has a probability  1 - 
F(D/X)).  (This  model and its extensions are discussed at greater  length in 
Cohen 1991a;  see also Eaton, Gersovitz, and Stiglitz, 1986.) 
The market price of the debt (such as observed on the secondary 
market)  can simply be written as: 
D/I  XQn 
q(D) =  -QdF(Q) + 1 -  F(D/)  . 
If a country were, say, to repurchase $1 of its debt on the secondary 
market,  this is the price that it would have to pay. If instead the country 
wants to repurchase an amount B and is known  to be willing to do 
so, then-as  Dooley (1988) first pointed out-the  price at which the 
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(Otherwise,  no lenders  will actually sell their claim). One then  gets that 
the price for the  transaction  has  to be: 
r(D-  B)IA  An 
q(D  -  B)  D=  fiD- 
B)  Q 
dF(Q)  +  1  -  F [(D  -  B)/X] 
Obviously,  if a debtor  country  is known  to be willing  to repurchase 
all of its debt  (B =  D) then  the only  price at which  the transaction  will 
be undertaken  is q =  1. 
This crucial remark makes it very undesirable  to set up,  say,  an insti- 
tution-endowed  with  a given  amount  of money-that  would  operate 
openly  to repurchase  LDC debt.  Such an institution  would  immediately 
raise the price and  defeat  its own  purpose. 
The point  that is made  by Bulow  and Rogoff radicalizes  this critique. 
Assume  that  the  country  (or  an  institution  acting  on  its  behalf)  re- 
purchases  a small fraction of the debt.  For the country,  what  matters is 
the (marginal) reduction  of the market value  of the debt,  that is 
p(D) =  V'(D)  =  1 -  F(D/X), 
which  is strictly (perhaps  much) lower than q(D). So even  if the country 
was  repurchasing  a fraction B of its debt $1 after the  other,  repeatedly 
taking the creditors by "surprise"  (i.e.,  they  never  expect  that the next 
dollar  will  be  repurchased,  but  they  always  know-at  each  point  in 
time-what  is the  exact stock of debt),  it would  still be over paying  its 
debt because  it would  pay: 
D  -  - 
f  q(D)dD, 
~DB  which is strictly more expensive than: 
AV=  V(D) -  V(D -  B)=  p(D)dD. 
D-B 
Bulow and Rogoff (1991) concluded  that this wedge  between  the cost 
of a debt  buy-back  and  its  real effect  on  the  market value  of the  debt 
makes  it unlikely  to turn buy-backs  into  a profitable investment.  Does 
this reasoning  apply  to the debt crisis of the 1930s and lead us to inter- 
pret  the  large  buy-backs  that  were  then  performed  as  an  unworthy 
investment?  Not  necessarily.  As was  pointed  out in Cohen  and Verdier 
(1990), a buy-back  can be  good  if it is  done  secretly. If-say-Morgan 78  COHEN 
repurchases  Brazil's debt-held  by Citicorp-on  Brazil's behalf without 
revealing  for  whom  the  purchase  is  made,  there  are no  limits  to  the 
extent  of  the  repurchases  that  can  be  made  by  Morgan  at  the  given 
price. (It is only when  Brazil's actions are discovered  that the price rises 
because  only  in that case the reduction  of its outstanding  external debt 
raises the price.) Obviously,  in the 1930s, the Latin American buy-backs 
were  only  revealed  after they  were  completed. 
Yet, as far as open  buy-backs,  such  as those  that the Brady deal en- 
courages,  it is obviously  crucial to make sure that the price at which  the 
buy-back is undertaken  is set appropriately.  This involves  a comprehen- 
sive  ex ante agreement  with  the  creditors,  so  that  none  of  them  can 
free-ride on  the  others.  This is exactly  what  the  Brady deal  has  done. 
In a process  called novation, it was  agreed that all the previous  debt had 
to be exchanged  against  one  of the three options  that were  available. 
In order to evaluate  empirically how  the Brady deal has worked,  I will 
first analyze  how  the average  and marginal prices can be reconstructed 
empirically. 
2.2.2  Econometric  Estimates  Previous  econometric  studies  of secondary 
market pricing include  Sachs and Huizinga  (1987), Fernandez and Ozler 
(1991), Ozler  and  Huizinga  (1992) and  Cohen  and  Portes  (1990). I will 
rely here on the price of 20 middle-income  countries for which the trans- 
actions  are relatively  frequent.  (Cf.  Financial Flows to Developing Coun- 
tries, Dec.  91). 
To the  extent  that  we  are interested  in  distinguishing  between  the 
average and the marginal price of the debt,  we  want  to estimate  a price 
equation  in  which  such  a  distinction  is  explicit.  Following  my  earlier 
work (Cohen,  1991a, ch.  4) I will use  a logistic  function  of the prices to 
account for this discrepancy.  Specifically,  I obtain (for 1989 data): 
Log1  =  -2.71  -  1.47 Log D/Q  +  5.48 HUN;  R2 =  0.72  (7) 
(-3.44)  (5.31) 
in  which  D  is  the  stock  of  the  debt,  Q is  per  capita income  [such  as 
measured  by Summers  and  Heston  (1988), in percent  of 1980 U.S.  per 
capita income].  HUN  is a proxy for Hungary  (Hungary  is controlled  for 
because  it is the only  country  in the  sample  that did not reschedule  its 
debt). 
By differentiating  both  sides,  holding  output  constant,  we  get: 
dq  _ 1.47(1 -  q)dD 
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There is consequently a threshold price for which the elasticity of 
price with respect to debt is (in absolute value) smaller than one. The 
price, here, is 
q* =  0.32 cents. 
In part coincidently, this price is not significantly different from the 
average price (= 0.35) of the representative  middle-income debtor at the 
end of 1989. 
Call V =  qD the market value of debt, one gets 
dV  dD(  dV  [1 -  1.47(1 -  q)  (8)  v  D 
One can also rewrite Equation (8) as: 
dV  dD 
dV=  1.47 [q -  q*] D, 
or equivalently, we can write that the marginal  price is: 
p =  1.47(q  -  q*)q. 
Below the price q*  there is a "debt Laffer  curve," as Krugman  (1988) 
puts it. Reducing the face value of the debt may raise  its market  value. 
As I emphasized in my earlier  work, however, there are only very few 
countries for which-with  95% confidence-this  mechanism is rele- 
vant. Around that threshold point, however, we can take the marginal 
price  of the debt to be nil. Lenders, as a whole, are essentially indifferent 
between one more or less dollar  on their books. For  countries  that would 
repurchase  their debt to the left of the price q*,  the deal would offer the 
bankers  a "boondoggle," as Bulow and Rogoff have put it for the Boliv- 
ian buy-back  that occurred in 1987. 
Another illustration  of Equation  (7) comes as follows. Consider a debt 
that is originally  priced at 32 cents. Assume that the debt is unilaterally 
written down by 50%. What is the real cost for the bankers of such a 
write-down? Using Equation (7), one gets that the 50%  write-off would 
bring the price to 0.57 so that the market value would go from 0.32 to 
0.285. This only represents an 11%  write-off in real terms. In nominal 
terms, the result is more spectacular:  a 50%  write-off only cost 3.5% of 
the original value of the debt! With a debt-to-GDP of 100%  (which is 
the average middle-income debtor level), this represents 3.5% of GDP. 
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brought  by a debt  settlement-if  only  it could  be appropriately  priced. 
(Similar conclusions  are reached  in the  simulation  studies  of Bartollini 
and  Dixit,  forthcoming  and  Cohen,  forthcoming).  We  shall  compare 
these  numbers  to the  negative  effects  of debt on growth  later. 
2.3 A VIEW  OF THE  BRADY  DEAL 
2.3.1  Test of the Seniority Hypothesis  A  simple  test  of the  seniority  hy- 
pothesis  amounts  to  analyzing  the  significance  of  the  composition 
(among  private and public creditors) of the total debt in the price equa- 
tion for commercial  debt.  Let us call D1 the  debt of the IFI. The results 
are given  here: 
q  D 
D 
Log  -2.72  -  1.46 Log  -  0.02 Log D- +  5.46 HUN; 
Logq  Q  D 
(-3.07)  (-0.05)  (4.83) 
R2 =  0.7 
(t statistic in parenthesis) 
We find that the composition  of the debt is not significant  at the 95% 
level  of confidence.  More IFI debt does  not depress  (when  holding  the 
aggregate  level  constant)  the  price of the  commercial  debt,  counter  to 
the  seniority  hypothesis.  Indeed,  if the  IFIs' debt  were  senior,  then- 
ceteris paribus-more  of it (holding  the aggregate  debt constant)  would 
reduce  the  share of the pie  that the commercial  banks are expecting  to 
get and  should  depress  the  commercial  debt's  price.  (Now  it may also 
be the case that two conflicting  effects are at work. More IFI money  may 
depress  the price of the commercial  banks  on the one  hand,  but it can 
also raise the prospect  of growth  of the country  so that, at the end,  the 
banks would  get a smaller slice of a larger pie). 
2.3.2  The Redistribution  of Wealth After the Mexican Deal  A  simple  way 
to analyze  a Brady deal  is  to recognize  that it amounts  to  having  the 
IFIs increase  their nominal  exposure  in the country by e dollars against 
a write-off  of  Tq  dollars  from  the  commercial  banks.  The  IFIs bring  E1 
dollars  in  cash,  E2  of  which  is  handed  to  the  commercial  banks,  e0 of 
which  is handed  to  the  country.  Note  that we  do  not  impose  e  =  El; 
for example,  e  >  e1 if there  is  a risk premium.  Along  the  lines  of  the 
model  presented  earlier,  let  us  analyze  the  distributional  implications 
(for the country,  the IFIs and the commercial banks) of such a combina- 
tion in two  cases,  when  the  IFIs are senior  or/and  when  the  IFIs have 
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by the IFIs (i  =  1) or the commercial  bank (i  =  2) and D the aggregate 
debt. 
a.  When the IFIs are senior creditors, V1 (.)  only  depends  on  D1 and  is 
worth: 
D1/k 
V,(D1) =  kQdF(Q) +  [1 -  F(D1/\)]Dl 
while 
(D1 + D2)/h 
V2(D,,D2) =  [Q  -  D]ldF(Q) +  D2[1  -  F(D/h)] 
JD1/A 
Let us now  investigate,  in such  a case,  the implications  of a Brady 
settlement. 
i.  The  IFIs nominally  raise  their  exposure  by  E dollars  against  E1 
dollars in cash.  In terms of the model  developed  earlier, one can 
write  that the IFIs consequently  gain: 
AG1 =  e[1  -  F(D1/X)]  -  E1 
in  which  the  first term  in  brackets  is  their  probability  of being 
repaid. 
ii.  The commercial  banks  get  the  e2 in cash  and  reduce  their expo- 
sure by  -q, but  they  also  lose  because  the  senior  creditors  have 
raised their exposure  by e. One  can calculate that the banks get: 
AG2  =  E2--  D  +  i.e. 
AG2 =  62  -  ut[1  -  F(D/X)]  -  e[F(D)  -  F(D1/-)] 
iii. Finally,  the  country  reduced  its debt  by  Tq -  E, and  gets  e0 in 
cash,  so that it gains: 
AGo =  [  - e][1  -  F(D/X)]  +  Eo 
One  can check that the game  is a zero-sum  game.  (Indeed,  in 
this  exercise,  we  do  not  take account  of the  potential  efficiency 
gains.)  So, for sure,  if the banks do not lose,  the game is a nega- 82  COHEN 
tive  sum  game  between  the  IFIs and  the  country.  Consider  in- 
stead  the  simple  case  (which  is  the  most  favorable  to  the  IFIs) 
when  F(D1/X) =  0: the IFIs (which  are senior creditors) expect to 
be paid fully,  and also assume  that E1 =  E2 =  E. In that case,  the 
banks'  gain turns out to be: 
AG2 =  [E -  q][1 -  F(D/I)] 
and the game  is simply  now  a zero-sum  game between  the com- 
mercial banks  and  the  country.  If the nominal write-off  from the 
commercial  banks  exceeds  the  cash  injection  of  the  IFIs, they 
lose,  no matter what.  The reason behind  this perhaps paradoxical 
result is that they  lose  on  two  accounts:  they  cut their exposure 
by -q, and  they  let the  senior  creditors raise their exposure  by e. 
b.  When the IFIs have an equal status, then  one  can write: 
D fD/X 
Vi =  1,2  V(Di) =  f  XQdF(Q) +  [1 -  F(D/X)]Di. 
The balance  then  comes  as follows.  Call (as before)  q the average 
price and  p the  marginal  price  of the  aggregate  debt.  One  can use 
the cross  derivative  to calculate that the IFIs gain: 
AG1 =  -E1  +  Ep +  (q -  p)  eD  +  D 
while  the commercial  banks  gain: 
AG2 =  +2  -  rP  -  (q -  P)  eD2  +  D1 
and the country  gains: 
AGo =  (n  -  e)p  +  Eo. 
c.  Empirical  evaluation of the Mexican deal 
As the studies  which  have  analyzed  in detail the Mexican deal have 
shown  (see  especially  Claessens  and Van Wijnbergen,  1990; Diwan 
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off their claim by about $12 billion,  while  the IFIs' exposure  has been 
raised by E =  $7 billion, which  was used to guarantee the new bonds. 
Let us  interpret  these  guarantees  as  a cash  payment  to  the  banks 
whose  value  is E2  =  $7(1  -  p)bl (because  they will not be used  with 
a probability p). With this interpretation,  we must consequently  take 
that the banks  have  written  down  their debt by 12  +  E2. 
To the  extent  that the  deal  may  have  been  anticipated,  it is hard 
to  say  what  the  "predeal"  price  of  the  debt  actually  was.  Using  a 
simulation  study,  Van Wijnbergen takes it to be 0.39; using an econo- 
metric equation,  Diwan  and  Kletzer also  conclude  that it is around 
0.40.  They  also  estimate  that  the  postdeal  price  is  about  0.50.  We 
follow  their  calculations  and  take  the  average  "average"  price 
(around  which  we  calculate  the  marginal  values)  to be  about  0.45. 
We consequently  get  the following  numbers: 
q =  0.45,  p =  0.086,  E =  E, =  7.0,  E2 =  6.4,  E0 =  0.6,  q =  18.4, 
D1 =  1/3, 
D 
=  2/3. 
D  D 
One  then  gets: 
AG1 =  -2.5 
G2 =  +0.9 
AGo=  +1.6 
So the  deal  now  appears  to amount  to a transfer from the IFIs to 
the  country,  with  the  banks  gaining  only  marginally.  (Diwan  and 
Kletzer finds that the banks gained,  while  Van Wijnbergen also finds 
that they  stayed  at par.) 
2.3.3  Is  the Brady Deal the Appropriate Vehicle for Settling the Debt Cri- 
sis?  While the deal appears  to not have been  detrimental  to the coun- 
try, it did  not  accomplish  what  it was  supposed  to.  What one  would 
want  is to allow  the country  to repurchase  (out of its own  resources)  a 
large amount  of  its  debt  (say  50%) at  a price  that  reflects  the  correct 
(marginal) value  of the  deal rather than  a small amount  using  the IFIs' 
money. 
Taking the numbers  reported  earlier, one  wants  to offer the country 
the  opportunity  to  use,  say,  an  extra $5 billion  to  repurchase  in  one 
block $50 billion. 
The difficulty  with  such  a deal is that if the country  does  accumulate 84  COHEN 
$5 billion  it will  then  become  the  prey  of the  banks  that will  want  to 
seize  the $5 billion  (without  giving  up their claims).  So what  we  would 
really need  is a commitment  from the banks  that they  will  sell (say over 
3 or 5 years)  their claims  at a price arranged  ex ante. In that case,  one 
gives the country the opportunity  to accumulate reserves  so as to benefit 
from the  deal.  Such  a deal would  make  it profitable for the  country  to 
embark on  an adjustment  program.  It would  not  create later conflicts 
with  the IFIs. 
3. Debt  and Growth 
In this  section  we  now  want  to  address  the  correlation  between  debt 
and  growth.  We  shall  first  investigate  the  extent  to  which  the  debt 
buildup  of  the  early  1980s can be  identified  as  an  important  cause  of 
the  slowdown  of  growth  during  the  past  decade.  This  will  open  the 
way to an empirical analysis  of the potential  efficiency  gains that a debt 
write-off could deliver.  We shall then attempt to draw more broadly the 
lessons  of the debt crisis to assess  the extent to which  one should  expect 
future foreign  finance  to speed  up growth  in the poor countries. 
3.1 GROWTH  FROM  THE 1960s TO THE 1980s 
3.1.1 A "Quasi Accounting" Framework  We shall set up,  here,  a "quasi- 
accounting"  framework  that builds  on  the  "augmented"  Solow  model 
analyzed  in  Mankiw,  Romer,  and  Weil  (1992) (henceforth  MRW). As- 
sume  that production  can be written  as: 
Qt =  Kt0H(AtLt)1- -,  (9) 
Kt  is physical capital, Ht is "human" capital, Lt  is raw labor (which grows 
exogenously  at rate n) and At is an exogenous  productivity  term (which 
grows  at rate ,u). Accumulation  of physical  and human  capital obeys: 
kt  =  -dKt  +  It  (10a) 
At =  -dHt  +  Zt  (10b) 
Define  Yt =  (Qt/Lt) output  per capita, at =  Log At, Yt =  Log Yt. One 
can log-linearize  Equations  (9) and  (10) as: 
dyt  =  p +  (1 -  a  -  B)(d +  n +  [L)[y  -  yt]  (11)  dt  Yt  y~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(1 The  Debt  Crisis:  A Postmortem  ?  85 
in which,  Yt is: 
yt=at  +  Logit  +  Log Zt  Yt 
-  o- 
a 
Qt  '-  -  or-  Qt 
(12) 
+-  1  Log(d  +  n +  x) 
1-^a-  fi- 
In MRW, 9t is taken as a proxy  of the  (Log of the) income  per capita 
steady-state  toward  which  the economy  is converging.  There is no rea- 
It  Zt  son  to make  such  an hypothesis  because  t  and  Q  can very  well  vary  Qt  Qt 
with the level  of income.  Equation (11) is simply  obtained  by differenti- 
ating  (9)  (around  its  initial  value)  while  taking  account  of  (10a,b)  to 
measure  the  increase  of capital.  In particular, an equation  such  as (11) 
is plainly consistent  with  a model  of endogenous  growth  (in which  the 
growth  of human  capital  can be  unbounded).  It nevertheless  remains 
the  case  that  one  can  interpret  Equations  (11) and  (12) as  a  "quasi- 
accounting"  framework.  It is  on  such  an  interpretation  that  we  shall 
draw in order to decompose  the origin of the growth  slowdown  in the 
1980s. 
3.1.2  A Benchmark  Equation  In this  section,  we  first estimate  Equation 
(11). Because  we  want  to pay  specific  attention  to shifts  in the  pattern 
of growth  over the sample  period,  we  shall pool the time averages  over 
the  following  four subsamples:  1960-1966,  1967-1973,  1974-1980,  and 
1981-1987.  We use  the  Summers-Heston  data  (1991) and  supplement 
them with World Bank data. Zt/Qt  is proxied by secondary  school enroll- 
ment.  (In  Cohen,  1991b,  I  show  that  MRW's  procedure  essentially 
amounts  to that.) The results are shown  in Appendix  1, column  1. These 
results are consistent  with the estimation  of Equation (9) when  a  =  0.55 
and p  =  0.24. The sum a  +  a  =  0.79 is in line with  the results in Barro 
and  Sala-i-Martin (1990) and  MRW (who  respectively  defended  a  +  B 
=  0.8 and  a  +  a  =  0.66).  The share  of capital is larger than in MRW 
(which  defended  the view  that ax =  3 =  1/3). 
The main feature that appears  from this regression  is the very signifi- 
cant slowdown  of growth  in the  1980s.  Growth  in the  1980s was  2.5% 
below  the level  that was  reached  in the  1960s ("all things  equal").  It is 
crucial to note  that this reduction  is obtained  even  though  the  "condi- 
tional dynamics"  that we  estimate  take account  of the investment  deci- 
sion.  It is therefore  not a shift in investment  that explains  the slowdown 
of growth  that we  are identifying  but  a loss  of  "productivity"  (which 86  COHEN 
obviously  must  take account  of the  fact that the  recession  of the  early 
1980s  has  pushed  the  economies  within  their  production  possibility 
frontiers). 
3.1.3  The Debtor Nations and the Terms of Trade  We now  investigate  the 
specific  pattern  of growth  of the  debtor  countries  and  take account  of 
the  terms  of trade  (a prime  suspect  for the  developing  countries  trou- 
bles).  We  shall distinguish  two  subgroups.  One  group  is the  group  of 
"moderately  and  severely  indebted  countries,"  such  as defined  by the 
World Bank (henceforth  the  SM group).  The other group  is composed 
of those  countries  that got into  "refinancing  difficulties,"  which  we  de- 
fine  as  countries  that  rescheduled  their  debt  more  than  once  in  the 
1980s. 
We then  add a last explanatory  variable: the  "trend" of the terms of 
trade in the  1970s and in the  1980s. The "trend" is taken by regressing 
the rate of growth  of the terms  of trade (within  each period)  on a time 
trend.  (For lack of comprehensive  data, we  do not include  the terms of 
trade in the  1960s. For the  subgroup  of countries  for which  we  did get 
this variable, we  did not find the terms of trade to be significant  in the 
period prior to the  seventies.) 
We consequently  ran the following  regressions 
g =  a +  bDi +  cD80 + dDi* D80 +  elinv  + ftot  +  Zi  (13) 
in which  Di is a dummy  for (respectively)  the group  of large-debtors  or 
the  group  of rescheduling  countries.  D80 is the  dummy  for the  1980s; 
Di * D80  is the  product  of the  two;  inv  and  tot are investment  and  the 
terms of trade; Zi are the  other time  dummies. 
The results  are in  columns  2 and  3,  Appendix  1. We now  find  that 
the nondebtor  countries  experienced  a significant  "productivity"  slow- 
down  in the  1980s of about  2.3%. Beyond  this  general  slowdown,  the 
group  of severely  indebted  countries  experienced  an additional  fall of 
about 0.9% (which  is only  significant  at the  10% degree  of confidence), 
while  the  group  of  rescheduling  countries  experienced  an  additional 
slowdown  of 1.4% (which is significant  at the 5% degree of confidence). 
In  addition,  the  debtors  experienced  a  lower  "trend"  in  the  rate  of 
growth  of their aggregate  productivity:  It is worth  about  0.6% in both 
groups  (and is only  significant  at the  10% degree  of confidence). 
This slowdown  of aggregate  "productivity  growth"  is obtained  when 
controlling  for the (adverse)  effects  of the investment  slowdown  and of 
the terms of trade shocks.  In order to get a measure  of these  two  addi- 
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similarly  the  investment  slowdown  that  was  experienced:  (1)  in  the 
eighties  (for all countries),  (2) for the  debtors  groups  (prior to the debt 
crisis), and (3) for both debtor groups  in the 1980s. Using  the measured 
elasticity  of growth  with  respect  to investment  such  as obtained  in col- 
umns  (2) and  (3) (in Appendix  1), we  then  calculated  the specific effect 
of the investment  slowdown  on growth.  We similarly decomposed  the 
specific effect  of the  terms of trade (prior to and during  the debt crisis) 
on the growth  of each of the two  subgroups  of debtors.  The results  are 
summarized  in Table 5. 
Table 5 must  be  read  as  follows.  In the  1980s,  growth  in  the  large 
debtor  group  was  4.9% below  the  previous  average  of  the  nondebtor 
countries.  Of  this  (extraordinary)  reduction,  about  half  (2.5%) was  a 
worldwide  phenomenon.  Another  half a percentage  point  is part of a 
trend  that  prevailed  in  these  countries.  Finally  the  specific  slowdown 
of  growth  in  the  large  debtor  group  is  1.9%,  0.2  of  which  is  due  to 
another  round  of  lower  investment  and  0.8  to  a bad  terms  of  trade 
shock.  So, at the end,  out of a fall of 4.9%, we  are left with  a remaining 
("unexplained")  productivity  slowdown  of  0.9%.  This  is  the  amount 
(apart from the investment  effect to which  we  shall return later) that is, 
perhaps,  to be explained  by the debt crisis. 
Table  5  SLOW  GROWTH  IN THE 1980s 
Slower  growth  Slower  growth 
"Productivity"  because  of  because  of 
slowdown  investment  term  of trade  Total  fall 
All countries  (1)  -2.3  -0.2  -  -2.5 
Additional fall in 
the large debtors 
(2) Trend  -0.6  -0.1  +0.2  -0.5 
(3) 80's  -0.9  -0.2  -0.8  -1.9 
Total  for the 
large debtors (4): 
(1) +  (2) +  (3)  -3.8  -0.5  -0.6  -4.9 
Additional  fall in 
the rescheduling 
countries: 
(5) Trend  -0.6  -0.4  +0.1  -0.9 
(6) 1980s  -1.4  -0.1  -0.5  -2.0 
Total for the 
rescheduling 
countries  (7): 
(1) +  (5) +  (6)  -4.3  -0.7  -0.4  -5.4 88  COHEN 
Another measure of the "total"  fall in the debtors' growth due to the 
debt crisis can be (roughly) obtained by estimating a growth equation 
without  controlling  for the investment and the terms of trade effect. This 
is shown  in columns  (4) and  (5) in Appendix  1. We estimate  a general 
fall of the growth rate in the 1980s of 2.5%, specific lower growth of 
the SM group of 1% (prior to the debt crisis) and a specific fall in the 
eighties  of  1.6% so  that,  at  the  end,  we  get  a  lower  growth  of  the 
SM group  of 5.1% (which  is  of  the  same  magnitude  as  the  aggregate 
reduction  of  4.9% that  we  estimate  in  Table 5).  Similarly,  for the  re- 
scheduling  countries,  we get an overall fall (with respect to the previous 
average of the nondebtors)  that amounts  to 5.5% (compared  to 5.4% in 
Table 5). 
3.1.4  The "Unexplained"  Residual  Let us now  turn to analyze  the extent 
to which  we  can trace back to the debt factor the origin of the "produc- 
tivity"  slowdown  (such  as measured  left by the residual  analyzed  ear- 
lier).  There  are  (at least)  six  terms  that  we  can  think  of  as  correlated 
with the debt crisis and that can explain the specific reduction  of growth 
in the debtor countries:  (1) the  stock of debt,  (2) the net resources  that 
were actually transferred by the debtors  to their creditors,  (3) the varia- 
tion of the share of imports  in GDP,  (4) the variation of the tax burden 
imposed  on  the  country  by  the  government,  (5) the  variation  in  the 
share of government  expenditure,  and  (6) the rise of inflation. 
When  including  these  six  factors  together,  we  found  that  none are 
statistically significant,  that the debt factor is wrongly  signed,  and that 
the unexplained  residual  is raised (in absolute  value)  to 1.1%! 
After a few iterations,  the only robust factor to emerge is the reduction 
in  the  share  of  imports  in  GDP,  which  is  only  significant  at the  10% 
degree  of confidence.  One  gets-by  taking account  of this item  only- 
that the unexplained  residual for the group of large debtors falls to 0.5% 
and again is only  significant  at the  10% degree  of confidence. 
The same paradox emerges  with  the group of rescheduling  countries. 
When  taking  account  of "everything,"  the  unexplained  residual  is not 
reduced.  When  taking  account  of the variation  in the  share of imports 
only, it is-again-reduced  by 0.5%. In this case, the unexplained  resid- 
ual is still statistically  significant  and worth  0.9%. 
3.1.5  Conclusion  The  fact that  the  group  of  large  debtors-and  espe- 
cially the  group  of  reschedulers-experienced  a specific  slowdown  of 
their growth rate (even after taking account of the fall of investment  and 
the variations  of their terms  of trade) is confirmed  by the  econometric 
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to be a function of the parameters that are (one would guess) highly 
correlated with the debt crisis (the stock of debt or the flows of net 
payments). One simple interpretation is that a country with a good 
prospect of growth can perhaps easily reimburse  its debt while-at  the 
other extreme-a  country that is vulnerable to sanctions may have to 
reimburse its debt at the cost of a lower growth so that no obvious 
correlation  between growth and payment is likely to be obtained. 
As far as the rescheduling countries are concerned, it may also be 
that once a country gets into financial  difficulties  (whatever  their magni- 
tude may be), it suffers a loss of confidence because of capital flight, 
external  liquidity problems, and so forth, which leads to a "productivity 
slowdown" captured by the rescheduling dummy, with little explana- 
tory power left for the other debt factors. 
Albeit one can always point to other factors, let us take here as a 
benchmark measure of the pure waste caused by the debt crisis the 
unexplained performance  of the reschedulers, that is, 0.9%  of GDP over 
the 6 years 1983-1988, or about 5.5%  of GDP. As we have shown earlier, 
it may cost 3.5%  of GDP to write down half of the debt of the reschedul- 
ing countries. With half its face value, we have also shown that the debt 
would have been sustainable (and below the 1980 level), so that one 
can assert that having written down half the debt, we may have avoided 
the crisis. This would have implied a return  of about 60%!  We obviously 
can not take these numbers at face value, but given the low cost of 
writing off a large fraction of the nominal debt, it does not take much 
of a net benefit to yield the result that repurchasing  (at the right price) 
the debt is a profitable investment. At a more intuitive level, it is not 
shocking to argue that a country would have willingly wanted (with 
the benefit of hindsight) to pay-say  over 2 or 3 years-an  extra cost 
amounting to 3.5% of its GDP to get its debt reduced by half and avoid 
the rescheduling limbo. 
3.2 BEYOND  THE  DEBT  CRISIS:  CAN FOREIGN  FINANCE  SPEED  UP 
GROWTH? 
3.2.1 Introduction Let us now look ahead and try to understand the 
lessons of the debt crisis. What should we think of the failure of the 
large debtors to grasp the opportunities that were offered by access to 
the world financial market?  Should we think that the failure was only 
"bad  luck" (the Reagan-Volcker  shock), or more deeply should we con- 
clude that the world financial  markets are not likely to help poor coun- 
tries very much? 
These questions have already arisen once more with respect to the 
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money  they  need  to build  up  their capital stock? Is it the case that free 
access  to the  world  financial  markets  could  help  these  countries  catch 
up  to  their  Western  counterparts  more  rapidly?  We  have,  before  our 
eyes,  the case of East Germany,  which  is a reduced  version  of what  the 
total release  of  specific  sovereign  risk can produce.  Large amounts  of 
resources  are flowing  from the West  to the East (more than $50 billion 
a year,  for only  16 million  people;  scaled  for Russia  (only)  this  would 
correspond  to more than $500 billion a year).  Even in this narrow case, 
voices  have  expressed  doubts  concerning  the  ability of  East Germany 
to  catch  up  "rapidly"  with  West  Germany.  Barro and  Sala-i-Martin 
(1991), in particular,  have  extrapolated  the  results  that they  found  for 
regions across  Europe  and  across  the  United  States  and  for  nations 
around the world  to the German case.  The speed  at which  poor regions 
(within  a  nation)  appear  to  catch  up  to  the  rich  ones  appears  to  be 
approximately 2% per year, a number that is remarkably about the same 
as the  speed  at which-they  found-the  poor nations  are catching  up 
to the rich ones.  According  to their calculations,  it would  then  take (no 
matter what)  about 25 years  to close  half the  gap between  the western 
and the eastern  parts of Germany,  a number  certainly bound  to disap- 
point  Chancellor  Kohl  and  likely  to  be  even  more  despairing  for the 
countries  that count  on foreign  finance  to raise their growth  rates. 
In a different  framework,  Krugman (1991) makes  the same claim that 
one  should  not  expect  capital  mobility  to  do  much  to reduce  the  gap 
between  the rich and the poor nations.  Past historical episodes  (before 
the  debt  buildup  of  the  1970s),  for one  thing,  never  really  show  the 
north  financing  the  south.  The  cases  in  which  one  can  point  toward 
some  success  in this matter are the regions  of "recent settlements"  such 
as  Australia,  Canada,  New  Zealand,  and  the  United  States  (and  also 
Argentina) in which  capital flows  substantially  helped  to finance capital 
accumulation.  In the case of Canada, for instance,  up to 40% of domestic 
capital accumulation  has been  financed  from abroad.  In contrast,  India 
(which  was  many  times  more densely  populated)  only absorbed a mar- 
ginal  part of  British surplus.  In conclusion,  Krugman  argues  that  the 
idea that foreign  finance  might  speed  up  growth  in the poor countries 
has been  "oversold." 
3.2.2  Theoretical  Background  Krugman characterizes  the problem as fol- 
lows: Either we  trust the Solow  model  (in which,  say Q =  AK'13L23)  and 
then  capital accumulation  only  plays  a minor role in explaining  growth 
(indeed,  asymptotically,  no  role  at all).  Or we  trust the  Lucas-Romer 
model,  but  then  there  is no  reason  for capital to flow  from the  rich to 
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profitable in the south,  where  it is scarce). Let us follow  here the middle 
ground  of MRW and  assume  that: 
Qt =  KtHt(AtLt)Y,  with a  +  L +  y =  1  (14) 
The (simple)  point  that I would  now  want  to make is the  following: 
whether  a  poor  country  can  count  on  foreign  finance  to  speed  up 
growth  critically depends  on its physical-human  capital ratio. When  it 
is low  (as, perhaps,  is currently  the case in Eastern Europe) then  there 
is room for foreign  finance  to speed  up growth  in a poor country. 
In Appendix  2, I sketch a simple  model  in which  I attempt to replicate 
theoretically  the results  that have  been  found  empirically by Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin.  If one  takes  "nations"  to  be  closed  economies  (which 
must count on domestic  savings  to accumulate  capital), then the domes- 
tic stock of capital is running  after a moving  target that corresponds  (at 
any  point  in  time)  to  the  level  Kt for  which  domestic  saving  would 
stabilize the capital output  ratio, that is,  a level  Kt such  that: 
s(Kt)'H(AtLt)'  =  (d +  n +  [,)Kt, 
in which  s is  the  domestic  saving  rate,  d is  the  depreciation  rate,  n is 
the rate of growth  of labor, and  ,u is the rate of growth  of productivity. 
Equivalently,  in log  terms,  one  can write: 
kt = 1  -  a ht +  o,, 
in which 
KC  l1og  s  k  =Log  ht =log  and  Log 
AtLt  Att  an 
c  1 - a  d + n  + 
Now,  if we  take "regions"  to be open  economies  for which  the mar- 
ginal product  of capital is equalized  to a given  interest  rate r, one  finds 
that the open  economy  target KS  is defined  through: 
ao(K)-1H?(AtLt)y  =  r +  d 
so that 
k=1  ht  +  00  k?=l_~ 92* COHEN 
I 
in which 
KO  1  k?  = Log  A,  00 =  Log  + 
AtLt  I  -  oL  y +  d 
As one sees the closed and the open economy targets have the same 
functional  form. (This  is due to the fact that the closed economy's saving 
rates determines the average productivity of capital, while the open 
economy determines the marginal productivity;  in the Cobb-Douglas 
case, they are proportional  to each other.) This explains why the pattern 
of growth of open and of closed economies may appear to be qualita- 
tively similar. (See Appendix 2 for more details.) Within such a frame- 
work, regions and nations will appear to converge at the same speed 
toward their steady states (the speed depending essentially on the law 
of motion of human capital), as found in Barro  and Sala-i-Martin. 
Yet, this framework  helps to indicate why Barro  and Sala-i-Martin's 
conclusion about the effect of turning a nation (East Germany) into a 
region (Eastern  Germany)  is misleading. It may very well be that both 
regions and nations appear to converge towards their (own) steady state 
at about the same speed, and yet when a nation becomes  a region (by 
being integrated to a larger  nation), its capital stock may well be shifted 
to a new point, from which it will return  to converging (at perhaps "2% 
a year") toward its new steady state. If one takes the case of a closed 
nation in which the saving rate is low,  turning this "nation" into a 
"region"  that faces a lower interest rate would then (rapidly)  lift up the 
capital stock. 
In terms of the figure below, a nation would go from an initial point 
Capital stock  A  B  Region 
B1 
Nation 
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A0 to  a terminal  point  A.  at 2%. East Germany  instead  goes  from Ao 
toward  Bo; it converges  at 2% a year toward  its steady  state only  after 
it has been  lifted up to B1. 
In other words,  a new access  to the world financial market may speed 
up growth  (even  though  open  regions  are not  observed  to grow  more 
rapidly than closed  nations)  if the capital stock of the nation  is initially 
low.  In order to analyze  when  this will be the case,  and when  sovereign 
risk constraints  are likely  to be binding,  one  needs  to be more  specific 
about the reasons  why  a "poor" country  may want  to raise its stock of 
capital. In terms of the model  sketched  earlier: 
a.  It may want to speed  up its transitional dynamics  toward its ("instan- 
taneous")  closed  economy  steady  state kc. 
b.  It may want  to raise "permanently"  its capital stock to the level,  k?, 
which  is consistent  with  the equalization  of the (social) rate of return 
to the rich countries'  returns. 
In the  first case,  the  sovereign  risk constraint  need  not  be binding: 
Financial markets simply  help  the countries  move  faster to a point  that 
is consistent  with  their domestic  ability to  save.  The  second  motive  is 
likely to be impossible  for nations: large transfers of sovereignty  (on the 
ownership  of capital) would  indeed  be  permanently needed  (assuming 
savings  are too low  in the debtor country). 
This typology  is also useful  in addressing  Krugman's point according 
to which  only  regions  of  recent  settlement  seem  to  have  enjoyed  the 
benefit  of foreign  finance  (before World War I). This may be due to the 
fact that  they  were  essentially  places  that  hardly  started  their  transi- 
tional dynamics  (being  characterized  by low  initial physical  capital and 
large initial human  capital) so that foreign lending  was  indeed  the right 
vehicle  to speed  up growth. 
3.2.3 The "Poverty  of Nations": A Typology  Let us now  investigate  empir- 
ically which  of  the  causes  outlined  previously  is  likely  to  explain  the 
poverty  of the  "poor"  nations  (characterized  by a "low"  per capita in- 
come)  and  consequently  assess  the  extent  to  which  the  access  to  the 
world  financial markets may  help  them. 
More specifically,  we  want  to  decide  if these  countries  are poor be- 
cause  of a "low" initial stock of physical  capital or, simply  because  of a 
low  initial  productivity.  "Low"  capital  stock  has  two  potential  mean- 
ings: (1) vis-a-vis  the steady  state to prevail in the closed  economy,  and 
(2) vis-a-vis  the  benchmark  case  in  which  the  free  mobility  of  capital 
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Let us consequently  define  two measures  of "poverty": one that mea- 
sures how  far a country's  initial capital stock (ko)  stands  with  respect  to 
the  level  to prevail  under  a free access  to the  world  financial  markets 
(k?)  and one that measures  how  far an economy  stands with respect to its 
closed economy  benchmark  (kC).  These two benchmarks  are calculated at 
the current level  of human  capital.  They  are consequently  aimed  at as- 
sessing  whether  a country  is poor  or rich in physical  capital relative to 
its stock of human  capital.  We define  the  open  economy  criterion as: 
00  = k0  -  ko 
while  the closed  economy  benchmark  is defined  as: 
WC  =  kc -  ko. 
Taking account  of  the  fact that y  =  ak  +  Ph, one  can write,  up  to  a 
multiplicative  constant  (1  ) and to an additive  constant  (00): 
o? =  [yo -  k0] 
and 
OC  = w0 +  logsl. 
We consequently  only  need  to know  the  physical  stock of capital in 
order to calculate  wO  and  oc (see  Cohen,  1991b, on  the  data).  (s1 is the 
average investment  rate in 1970-1988.) 
The results  are shown  in Table 6. We report the values  obtained  for 
the  20 countries  that  we  examined  earlier and  for the  average  OECD 
countries  in  1970 and  in 1988. It is first extraordinary to note  the wide 
differences  of capital-output  ratios across the world.  (This point  is also 
emphasized  in  MRW.)  When  interpreted  in  terms  of  rate of  returns, 
these  amount  to differences  that range from 15.5% in the case of France 
and Germany  to about 45.5% in the case of Thailand and Philippines. 
While most LDCs are off the open  economy  benchmark,  only a few (9) 
of them  were  (two  OECD standard  deviations)  off the closed  economy 
benchmark in 1988. The latter are: Malawi,  Tanzania,  Zimbabwe,  Hong 
Kong, Pakistan, Brazil, Philippines,  and Thailand (plus Australia, which 
is the only  OECD country  to be "capital poor" with  respect  to the open 
economy  target).  When  testing  this  hypothesis  formally,  one  finds 
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as far as the  open  economy  criterion is concerned  but not  significantly 
(at the  95% degree  of  confidence)  off  the  OECD average  as far as  the 
closed  economy  benchmark  is concerned.  On  the other  hand,  in 1970, 
one  finds  that they  were  off both benchmarks.  So,  to some  extent,  the 
large debtors  did  follow  their  transitional  dynamics  over  the  past  two 
decades.  Were they helped  by the access to the world financial markets? 
3.2.4  Capital Accumulation in the Group of Large Debtors Prior to the Debt 
Crisis  In order to find  out  if this is the case,  we  analyze  the  speed  of 
capital accumulation  in  the  group  of  large  debtors  and  compare  it to 
capital accumulation  in  the  other  nondebtor  developing  economies  in 
the  1970s (prior to the  debt  crisis).  Specifically,  we  regress  the  growth 
rate of physical  capital (dk) on the initial value  of (the log of)  per capita 
income  (yo) and of physical  capital per head  (ko). 
We first analyze  capital accumulation  for a sample  of 48 developing 
Table  6  DISTANCE  "OFF"  OPEN ECONOMY  (OMEO)  AND CLOSED 
ECONOMY  (OMEC)  BENCHMARKS 
1970  1988 
OMEO  OMEOC  OMEO  OMEOC 
Algeria  0.16  3.50  -0.79  2.55 
Egypt  1.78  3.58  0.82  2.63 
Ivory Coast  0.98  3.27  0.39  2.68 
Morocco  1.29  3.54  0.41  2.66 
Nigeria  1.09  3.59  0.09  2.58 
Sudan  3.52  4.04  2.10  2.62 
Zaire  1.83  4.17  0.10  2.45 
Mexico  -0.41  2.58  -0.33  2.67 
Argentina  -0.54  1.91  -0.17  2.28 
Brazil  -0.52  2.46  - 0.04  2.94 
Chile  -0.72  3.20  -0.04  2.44 
Colombia  -0.33  2.47  -0.19  2.62 
Ecuador  -0.48  2.75  -0.48  2.75 
Peru  0.13  2.85  -0.16  2.57 
Venezuela  0.19  3.02  -0.06  2.76 
Pakistan  -0.46  2.07  0.58  3.11 
Philippines  0.31  3.28 
Turkey  -0.28  2.82  -0.36  2.74 
Large  Debtors  0.70  3.17  0.16  2.67 
OECD  -0.82  2.40  -0.65  2.57 
(OECD  standard 
deviation)  (0.79)  (0.76)  (0.24)  (0.15) 96  COHEN 
countries, while  controlling for the group of large debtors (dummy 
DSM). We get: 
dk =  -0.10  -  0.026 DSM  +  0.0823 yo -  0.0610 ko;  R2 =  0.66 
(-2.25)  (6.71)  (-9.1) 
(t statistic in parentheses). Period of estimation: 1970-1980. 
This regression is interesting in its own right. Capital accumulation 
appears to be positively correlated with initial income and negatively 
correlated  with the initial stock of physical capital. When one takes the 
view that yo =  h  (ho +  ko),  this also implies a positive correlation  with 
initial human capital and a negative correlation with initial physical 
capital. The key result of interest to us, however, is that the capital in 
the severely indebted countries grew less rapidly than capital in the 
other developing countries. 
A key feature of the large debtor countries' capital accumulation is 
revealed when  one tests for the stability of the partial correlation of 
capital accumulation with respect to yo and k0.  When one restricts the 
sample to the subgroup of debtors only, one gets: 
dk =  -0.15  +  0.083 yo -  0.059 ko; 
(5.7)  (-  7.3) 
R2 =  0.64 (t statistics in parentheses) 
Period of estimation: 1970-1980. 
As one sees, the coefficients  obtained for the subsample of large debt- 
ors appear to be essentially identical to the coefficients for the devel- 
oping countries at large. (A Chow test formally rejects the hypothesis 
that the coefficients are different.) 
One conclusion that one draws from these results is that the 1970s 
failed to change the qualitative pattern of capital accumulation in the 
group of large debtors. In those countries, capital  accumulation  was less 
rapid, but for exogenous  rather than for endogenous  reasons. One 
consequently gets the intuition that the group of large debtors behaved 
more like a closed economy with a low saving rate rather than as an 
open economy. 
3.2.5 Domestic  Saving  and  Investment  Off  and  at Financial  Autarky In order 
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closed  economy  benchmark,  let me-briefly-build  on  previous  work 
to calculate  a "financial  autarky" investment  rate and  see  how  far off 
that benchmark  the  group  of  large  debtors  stood  over  the  past  three 
decades. 
In order to calculate the rate of investment  that would  have prevailed 
under financial  autarky,  let us assume  that investment  is a function  of 
an  exogenous  (predetermined)  set  of  variables  (xi) and  of  a  shadow 
cost of capital,  p. One  then  writes: 
Q=  aixi -  ap  +  e 
Similarly, assume  that saving  can be written  as: 
S 
=  bixi +  3pp  +  T 
Q  i 
Given  the national  account  identity,  one  knows  that: 
S = I +  TB 
with  TB the resource  balance.  Substituting  for the value  of p, which  is 
consistent  with  the availability  of funds,  one  gets: 
QI  __  1+  (ai  + otbi)xi  +  E +  O  -  T  +  B  Q  (15) 
(15) 
The  first term in  the  brackets  is  nothing  else  but  the  "financial  au- 
tarky" investment  rate,  that is,  the  rate to prevail when  p is  (domesti- 
cally) set so as to impose  I =  S. The second  coefficient  is a crowding  in 
or out coefficient.  Perhaps  more intuitively  one  can characterize 
at+b 
as  the  "leakage"  of  foreign  finance  out  of  investment  into  aggregate 
consumption. 
TB 
While  the  relation  (15) is always true,  whether  T-  is determined  en- 
dogenously  or exogenously  set  out  of  a rationed  access  to  the  world 
financial market, it can only be econometrically  tested  in the latter case. 
In another  work  (Cohen,  forthcoming),  I have  tested  this correlation 
over the 1960s and during the 1980s for the group of rescheduling  coun- 
tries, on the ground  that both  these  subsamples  were  characterized by 98  COHEN 
a restricted  access to the world financial  market. I found that over both 
subperiods, the coefficients  +  were not statistically different and 
around 0.30. This shows  that the "leakage" of foreign finance out of 
investment (the coefficient  /c/a  +  3)  is very large because it amounted 
to 2/3 of the foreign impulse (whether its sign was positive as in the 
1960s, or negative as in the 1980s). 
Let me simply report here the results of a regression in which the 
impact of the trade balance onto investment is distinguished according 
to the time subperiods (1960s, 1970s, and 1980s) and-in  the 1980s- 
according  to the status of the developing country (rescheduling, nonre- 
scheduling). One gets: 
=  5.27  -  3.17 DLA  -  2.90 DAF +  2.37 D7481 -  1.76 D8287 
(2.28)  (-3.02)  (-2.42)  (2.09)  (-1.76) 
+  1.14 POPERT -  0.29.10 -INFL  +  0.17  +  0.21 yo 
(1.92)  (-2.23)  (4.31)  (2.40) 
+  0.10 ENROL1 -  0.33 KTB60 -  0.17KTB70 
(5.12)  (-4.64)  (-2.58) 
-  0.31 KTB80R -  0.20 KTB80NR;  R2 =  0.56 
(-8.29)  (-6.38) 
(t statistics in parentheses), 
in which DLA and DAF are Latin American and African dummies; 
D7481, D8287  are time dummies for 74-81 and 82-87, POPERT  is popu- 
lation growth; INFL  is the inflation rate, X/Q is the export-to-GDP  ratio, 
yo is beginning of period per capita income, ENROL  is primary school 
enrollment. KTB60,  KTB70,  KTB80R,  and KTB80NR  are the trade bal- 
ance in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s in the group of rescheduling and 
nonrescheduling countries, respectively. 
All attempts to instrument the trade balance in the seventies reduced 
the crowding out coefficient. Furthermore,  when one uses a regression 
based on the 1960s only to forecast the 1970s, one finds that the regres- 
sion overpredicts  the share of investment in GDP by about 1% for all 
countries and 1.5% for the debtor countries (albeit the differences are 
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is  not  appropriately  dealt  with  in  the  seventies  and-for  the  nonre- 
schedulers-in  the 1980s, we  are led to a simple  conclusion:  The impact 
of foreign finance on investment  never seems  to have exceeded  the level 
that it reached  in  the  1960s,  of  about  0.3.  (See  also  Warner,  1991, for 
an  analysis  that  rejects  the  hypothesis  that  the  debt  crisis  caused  the 
investment  slowdown.)  As I show  in my earlier paper, this is consistent 
with  the  view  that the  intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution  is about 
1/3 (which  is quite  reasonable).  In other words,  the  leakage  of foreign 
finance into consumption  is a feature that one  should  expect  whenever 
a  poor  country  starts  borrowing.  As  the  case  study  of  Singapore  by 
Young (1992) shows,  however,  there are cases when  this feature can be 
avoided  through  (a quite authoritarian) government  policy. 
3.2.6 Conclusion  One  sees  that investment  never  appears to have gone 
very far off the closed  economy  benchmark  in the group  of large debt- 
ors.  This explains  why  we  found  no endogenous difference  in their rate 
of capital accumulation.  With the  numbers  that we  got,  even  a deficit 
of 6% of GDP would  only  raise domestic  investment  by 2%. To get an 
estimate  of its impact on growth,  one  can take equation  (11) to see  that 
it would  only generate  an additional  growth  of 0.4%. The success  story 
of East Asia  teaches-from  that perspective-a  simple  lesson.  It saves 
60% more than the rest of the developing  countries,  and this may gener- 
ate  (from  equation  11) an  extra  growth  of  per  capita  income  of  3%. 
Taking account  of the leakage  coefficient  that we  estimated,  this would 
require an external deficit of 30% of GDP! When  one remembers  that- 
at best-the  large debtors  seem  capable  of servicing  no more  than 3% 
of GDP, one sees why  sovereign  risk comes  very quickly to be a binding 
constraint.  (See  Marcet and  Marimon,  1991,  for a similar conclusion.) 
This is why  regional integration  could  make  a difference.  However  big 
the  number  may  look,  30% of  their  GDP  may  well  actually  be  what 
Eastern Germany  is currently receiving  from the West. 
Do  these  results  foreclose  the  role  of foreign  finance  as a vehicle  to 
speed  up  growth?  Not  entirely.  For one  thing,  direct investments  are 
always  welcome  to the extent  that they  help  transfer technologies.  But 
even  debt finance  can play a role if it helps  by speeding  up (rather than 
by  shifting  up)  the  transitional  dynamics  of  a  poor  country  from  an 
initially low  level  of physical  capital to a higher  level,  provided  that the 
higher level is consistent  with  domestic  saving.  In order to have foreign 
finance  perform  such  a role,  it must  be  (besides  controlling  its saving 
rate) that the "poor" country is relatively well  endowed  in human  capi- 
tal and relatively  poor in physical  capital. Although  this is a rare combi- 
nation,  this may be a good  description  of Eastern Europe today. Appendix  1:  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE-GROWTH  RATE OF PER CAPITA INCOME  1960-1987 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
c  0.37.10-2  0.029  0.030  0.068  0.058 
(1.66)  (1.78)  (4.09)  (3.78)  Z 
D6773  0.90.10-3  0.16.10-2  0.15. 10-2  0.27. 10-2  0.24. 10-2 
(0.23)  (0.42)  (1.62)  (0.67)  (0.62) 
D7480  -0.98.10-2  -0.62.10  2  -0.63.10  2  0.89.10  2  -0.95.10-2 
(-2.44)  (-1.57)  (-1.62)  (-2.13)  (-2.33) 
D8187  -0.03  -0.023  -0.022  -0.025  -0.026 
(-7.39)  (-4.50)  (-4.75)  (-4.66)  (-5.35) 
DSM  -0.60.10-2  -0.010 
(-1.62)  (-2.63) 
DSM81  -0.89.10-2  -0.016 
(-1.38)  (-2.50) 
DRES  -0.57.10  2  -0.99.10  2 
(-1.60)  (-2.87) 
DRES81  -0.014  -0.019 
(-2.22)  (-2.96) 
TT7481  0.18  0.18 
(4.01)  (4.26) 
LINV  0.020  0.017  0.014 
(2.84)  (4.60)  (3.66)  o-2 
LYI  - 0.74.102  -0.91.10-2  -0.88.10-2  -0.92.10-2  -0.81.1 
(-2.70)  (-3.31)  (-3.28)  (-3.24)  (-2.94) 
LENR2  0.85.10-2  0.82.10-2  0.93. 10-2  0.12  0.012 
(2.84)  (2.73)  (3.21)  (3.88)  (4.14) 
t statistic in parentheses.  Explanatory  variable: D6773,  D7680,  D8187:  time  dummy;  DSM: dummy  for severely  and  moderately  indebted  country;  DRES: 
dummy  for rescheduling  countries;  DSM81  -  DSM * D8187; DRES81  -  DRES * D8187; TT7481: terms of trade after 1974; LINV: log of share  of investment 
in GDP; LYI: log of initial  per capita income;  LENR2: log  of secondary  school  enrollment. The  Debt  Crisis:  A Postmortem  ? 101 
APPENDIX  2 
Assume  that output  is: 
Qt =  KtH?LP  where at +  + y  =  1  (Al) 
and write the law  of motion  of capital to be: 
Kt+  1 =  (1 -d)Kt  +  It  (A2) 
in which  It is the amount  of investment  undertaken  at time t. 
Assume  that  Ht ("human  capital,"  or  perhaps  more  appropriately 
"immaterial capital") can only be accumulated  domestically  and follows 
a law of motion  that can be written  as: 
Ht+  =  (1 -  8)Ht +  s2HKtLt--  .  (A3) 
in which  s2 is the number  of hours  spent  on education  (and,  say, collin- 
ear with  school  enrollment  data) while  HK'KtKt-X-v is a measure  of an 
"aggregate"  stock of knowledge  that education  builds  upon. 
Let us now  assess,  within  such  a framework,  the extent  to which  the 
access to the world  financial market changes  the pattern of growth  of a 
nation. 
1. Dynamics  in the Closed  Economy 
So as to simplify  the analysis  of the  dynamics,  let me assume  that d = 
8 =  1, so that the time interval is, say, one generation,  and assume  that 
population  growth  is zero. 
Assume  that It =  s,Qt in which  s,  is the  propensity  to save  (say,  of 
the young  generations).  In this  case,  one  can write  (in Log terms)  the 
dynamics  of the economy  as: 
kt+l =  Log sl  +  ctkt  +  h  (A4) 
ht+1 =  Logs2  +  vkt +  kht  (A5) 
The  system  is converging  toward  a steady  state  (which  depends  on 
sl and s2) if and only  if (a  -  1)(X -  1)  -  3v >  0. 102  COHEN 
2. Dynamics  in the Open  Economy 
Assume  now  that  the  country  has  a  totally  free  access  to  the  world 
financial markets so that capital can freely flow in up to the point where 
f 
(Kt+p,Ht+  ,Nt +)  =  1 +  r 
so that 
=00+1  ht  with 00 =  1  Log 
t 
(A4')  kt =  30?  1-  1-or  1  +  r  = 
Assume  furthermore  that the  law  of motion  of human  capital is not 
dependent  upon  the  way  physical  capital  is  accumulated.  One  then 
finds that the system  (A4') and (A5) is converging  toward a steady  state 
if and  only  if  +  X -  1 <  0, which  is the  same condition as in the 
1 -  cx 
closed economy  case. 
3. Intuition 
The result is intuitive  because  the  open  economy's  capital stock is 
kt  = 1  a a ht +  00 
while  the law of motion  of capital in the closed  economy  can be written: 
kt+l  -  kt  =  (1  -  -  )[kt  -  kt] 
in which 
kt =  1  ht +  Oc;  withc  =  1  Logs1. 
Up  to a constant,  the  closed  economy  is  running  after a target that 
has the same dependency  on human  capital as the open  economy  capi- 
tal stock.  If one  system  is converging  toward a steady  state,  so must be 
the other one.  To go  one  step  further in the  analysis  of the  dynamics, 
first consider  the  simple  case  in which  v  =  0. In that case,  the  closed 
economy  has two  eigenvalues  that are simply  k and a,  while  the open The  Debt  Crisis:  A Postmortem  ? 103 
economy  has only one,  X. If a >  k, then the closed  and the open  econo- 
mies  look  different.  The  closed  economy  asymptotically  converges  to- 
ward  its  steady  state  at  a  speed  1  -  a,  while  the  open  economy 
converges  at a speed  1 -  X. If instead  k >  at (as it is intuitively  the case, 
and as appears to be the case when  testing  directly an equation  such as 
(A3)) then,  asymptotically,  human  capital accumulation  will be driving 
the  growth  rate of  the  economy  in both  cases,  and  both  of  them  will 
asymptotically  converge  at the speed  (1  -  K). In the general  case when 
v #  0, this is still qualitatively  true if 1  is small with  respect  to X. 
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Comment 
JEREMY  BULOW 
Stanford  University  and  NBER 
As usual,  Daniel  Cohen  has written  a wide-ranging  paper that touches 
on a variety of interesting  topics.  In the interests  of brevity, I will confine 
my  remarks to just  a few  areas-Cohen's  estimates  of private creditor 
losses  during  the  debt  crisis,  the  importance  and  the  measurement  of 
official creditor seniority,  and  a critique of the  Brady plan deals. 
1. Losses  of the commercial  banks 
Cohen argues that losses  on Third World debt have been small, measur- 
ing returns in dollars  and using  data from the World Debt Tables.  But 
as he  acknowledges,  currency  differentials  can greatly  influence  these 
results.  For example,  from  1985 to  1987 Brazil paid  in  $242 million  to 
the World Bank. At the  same  time,  its debt  to the  Bank grew  from $4 
billion to $9.4 billion,  primarily because  these  loans  were  in currencies 
that rose  dramatically  against  the  dollar.  All told,  almost  two  thirds of 
the growth  in World Bank claims  against  the  Third World during  this 
period,  when  outstanding  loans  rose  from  $36.6 billion  to $89 billion, 
was  due  to  the  dollar's  decline.  This  does  not  imply  that  the  Bank, 
which  assiduously  hedges  most of its currency risk, made extraordinary 
profits from these borrowers.  Similarly, looking  at results in dollars may 
understate  the losses  of the commercial  lenders. 
How  can we  appropriately  measure  the  losses  suffered  by  the  com- 
mercial banks,  given  the  currency  issue?  Ideally,  any  measure  should 
indicate  that if a bank lent  at the riskless  interest  rate, forgave  none  of 
its debt,  and could realize 100 cents  on the dollar for outstanding  loans, 
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then the bank would  have  broken even.  Similarly, if a country  paid no 
cash  out  since  the  initial  period,  then  the  loss  of the  creditors  should 
be proportional  to the discount  at which  the debt is selling.  It turns out 
that there  is  a fairly  simple  formula  that  has  these  and  other  equally 
desirable properties. 
To calculate the amount  that private creditors have  lost  since  the be- 
ginning  of  the  debt  crisis,  I assume  that  (1) all debt  repayments  are 
made  at  the  end  of  the  year;  (2) the  World  Bank's  estimates  of  debt 
stock reduction  apply  to private debt,  while  "debt forgiveness"  applies 
to  official  debt;  and  (3) on  average,  debtors  were  charged  an  interest 
rate  that  would  have  given  the  lenders  a  two-point  profit  were  the 
loans repaid in full.  (On average,  countries  paid roughly  2% more than 
LIBOR,  but  lender  costs,  including  administrative  expenses,  were 
clearly above  LIBOR.) 
The private creditors' losses  can then  be calculated  as: 
T  D,  TNTt  r  D, 
=1  -T  Dt +  NTt -  Xt  1  Dt  +  D, + NT, -  X' 
where 
Lo  amount  of loss in present value as a function  of debt outstanding 
at t  =  0; 
PT =  the price of debt at terminal  time  t; 
Dt =  debt  outstanding  at the end  of year t; 
NTt =  the net transfers made  in year t; 
and  Xt  =  .02Dt  -  Ft, where  Ft is  the  amount  of  debt  reduction  that 
occurs  in  year  t.  That  is,  Xt would  represent  the  creditors'  economic 
profits  in  year  t,  if  they  received  a  gross  interest  rate 2% above  the 
riskless rate and then granted  debt reduction  of Ft, if its debt was worth 
par at both  the beginning  and  end  of the year. 
Using  this methodology,  it is possible  to estimate  that, from the end 
of  1981 until  the  end  of  1990,  the  commercial  banks  lost  over  30% of 
their initial investment,  even  assuming  an average debt price of 50 cents 
on  the  dollar  at the  end  of  1990.  (The data  used  is  from  recent  hard 
copy  editions  of the World Debt Tables,  Vol.  1, looking  at the relevant 
variables  in  the  tables  for all developing  countries.  1981 is  defined  as 
year 0 and  1990 as year  T =  9.) There is no moral issue  here-the  fact 
that the banks have  made very poor returns in some  countries  does  not 
imply  that the  leaders  of  those  countries  should  strive  to do  more  for Comment .  107 
the banks  in the  future-but  for commercial  banks  that typically  have 
equity  stakes  that  are less  than  a  tenth  of  total  assets,  losses  of  this 
magnitude  are very  serious. 
2. Seniority 
Whether official creditors are senior or junior to commercial creditors is 
one  of the major underexplored  areas of the  debt crisis.  It is obviously 
quite relevant  to "burden  sharing,"  the issue  of whether  official or pri- 
vate  creditors bear the bulk  of the  cost  of any  debt restructuring  plan. 
Furthermore,  we  can  also  learn  something  about  the  net  effect  of  a 
restructuring  on  a country  if we  understand  more  about  seniority.  For 
example,  a number  of  calculations  indicate  that private  creditors  may 
have  gained  a little,  or perhaps  broken  even,  from the  Mexican  Brady 
deal.  If official creditors  as a group  are, in fact, certain to be repaid in 
full,  then  these  creditors  presumably  did  not  lose  anything  from  the 
Mexican restructuring either. The implication would  be that the Mexican 
Brady deal  did not  reduce  the  expected  present  value  of the  country's 
future debt repayments,  only the variance around those  payments.  Any 
gain to Mexico from the deal would  have to stem from the new  contract 
requiring repayments  that were  less  state contingent. 
While  I applaud  Cohen's  efforts  in  this  area,  there  is  a problem  in 
estimating  the price of debt as a function  of the share of official creditors. 
That is because  it is well  known  that official creditors have  gone  out 
of  their  way  to  lend  to  countries  who  did  not  have  access  to  private 
lenders.  It is  therefore  necessary  to  use  an  instrumental  variables  ap- 
proach to remove  the endogeneity  of official share and debt price. Ken- 
neth  Rogoff and I do this in Bulow  and Rogoff  (1992) and,  like Cohen, 
find  no  compelling  evidence  that  official creditors  are either  senior  or 
junior to private creditors. 
There is also the issue  of whether,  even  if all official creditors are not 
senior,  the  World  Bank  and  IMF have  some  kind  of  priority.  These 
institutions  almost  invariably get repaid in full. The IMF has even  been 
able to extract $4 billion  from sub-Saharan  Africa over  the last 6 years. 
But it is possible,  if not likely, that these  "preferred creditors" are repaid 
out  of the  pockets  of other  aid agencies  so  that,  for example,  the  IMF 
repayments  in  sub-Sharan  Africa may  have  been  financed  by aid from 
the  International  Development  Agency  and  the  bilateral aid  agencies. 
What this  implies  is that,  even  if the  IMF and  World Bank always  get 
repaid,  there  is  nothing  inconsistent  with  Cohen's  result  that  official 
creditors  as  a group  are not  better  than  equal  priority,  and  new  IMF 
loans  may  create  a burden  that  is  primarily,  if  not  totally,  borne  by 108  BULOW 
official creditors.  The nature of World Bank and IMF seniority  is still an 
unresolved  research question. 
3. The  Brady  Plan 
I am somewhat  more  sanguine  than  Cohen  is about the efficacy of the 
Brady plan.  It is worthwhile  to recall how  the need  for the Brady plan 
developed.  Early in the  debt  crisis,  restructuring  typically  involved  no 
debt forgiveness.  For example,  assume  that a country owed  $50 billion, 
on  which  $5 billion  in interest  was  owed.  The country  might  agree  to 
pay  all of  its  interest  obligations,  if creditors  would  agree  to  lend  an 
extra $2 billion,  reducing  the country's  cash cost to $3 billion. 
Typically,  all lenders  would  be  asked  to  participate  proportionately 
in  the  new  loan.  Because  the  country's  debt  might  only  be  worth  80 
cents  on the dollar, there would  be a free rider problem.  An individual 
bank would  be about 8% worse  off in the example  if it agreed  to relend 
40% of its interest income,  and the new  loans were worth 20% less than 
face value,  than if it refused  to participate in the new  money  package. 
While  many  small banks  did  not  participate  in new  money  packages, 
the  benefits  of  free  riding  were  not  that  large,  and  the  costs  to  the 
remaining banks of making up for the free riders were also manageable. 
By the  late  1980s,  such  deals  were  less  feasible.  By this  time  many 
countries'  debts  had  increased,  with  no  comparable  increase  in  their 
capacity to repay.  Now  debts  were  selling  at 30 cents  on the dollar and 
sometimes  less.  The discount  that a bank could  save  by free riding  on 
a new  money  package  would  be  3.5  times  as  great  at a debt  price of 
30  (discount  of  70%) than  when  debt  sold  at  80  (discount  of  20%). 
Furthermore,  if the country  were  to pay a smaller fraction of the larger 
interest  payment  in  cash,  the  free  riding  incentive  would  be  further 
magnified.  At this level,  more banks were  likely to refuse  to participate 
in new  money  negotiations,  and  larger banks  might  have  been  better 
off with  partial default,  in which  a country  paid only part of its interest 
due and did not receive  a new  loan,  than with  a new  money  agreement 
in which  they  were  required to put up most  of the funds. 
The  Brady plan  recognized  the  problem  of  negotiating  new  money 
deals  when  the  price  of  debt  is  too  low.  Effectively  the  commercial 
banks,  under  pressure  from  governments,  agreed  to  accept  relatively 
small lump  sums  in return for substantial  reductions  in the  amount  of 
private  debt.  The best  estimates  are that  the  banks  did  not  lose  from 
these  deals.  For example,  if a country had 80 in debt outstanding,  worth 
40 cents  on  the  dollar,  and was  able to reduce  the  debt to 40 in return 
for a payment  of 4,  then  creditors would  break even  if the price of the Comment  .  109 
remaining  debt rose to 70 cents,  leaving  the creditors with  a total pack- 
age worth  $32 billion  both  before  and  after the  deal.  This implies  that 
any gains from the Brady deals did not come at the expense  of creditors. 
But with  the  price  of  debt  raised  by  the  buy-back  any  needed  future 
debt restructurings  may be easier. 
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Cohen  (1991) following  his  "Theoretical  Autopsy"  has  produced  this 
equally valuable piece  "A Post Mortem." His next piece on international 
debt might  yet be called "The Night  of the Living Dead,"  if indeed  the 
1990s does  not turn out to be the decade  of grand settlement  of the debt 
problem. 
This  thought-provoking  piece  recapitulates  a  number  of  the  major 
debates on developing  country indebtedness  over the last decade.  Three 
important aspects  of the debt issue  are addressed.  First is the question 
of whether  the  Brady deal  is a good  vehicle  to achieve  a grand  settle- 
ment  of the  debt  crisis.  Cohen  suggests  the  answer  is no.  The second 
question  is whether  productivity  growth  of  highly  indebted  countries 
fell  between  the  1960s  and  the  1980s.  Cohen  presents  evidence  that 
productivity  growth has slowed  down  for rescheduling  countries during 
the  1980s.  However,  he  is  unable  to  link  conclusively  this  slowdown 
to countries'  indebtedness.  Finally,  based  on  estimation  of investment 
equations,  Cohen  sugggests  that access  to foreign  finance  in the  1970s 
has not enhanced  investment  opportunities  in the borrower  countries. 
Cohen's  emphasis  on  the  settlement  of debts  seems  somewhat  puz- 
zling  given  his  negative  findings  on  the  effects  of  indebtedness  on 
growth  and foreign  finance  on investment. 
Why is settlement  of nominal  debts  an issue?  One  reason  is the debt 
overhang:  the presence  of a large amount  of debt that creditors do not 
expect  to be fully repaid.  See Krugman (1987). Large secondary-market 
discounts  indicate  creditors'  pessimism  about  the  prospects  for repay- 
ment.  In much  of  the  literature  debt  overhang  is viewed  as  a tax on 
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investment.  Increased  output  is held  to increase  the  amount  a country 
will repay,  as it shares the returns of investment  with  foreign creditors. 
Hence,  repayment  acts as a tax on  investment.  A second  consequence 
of debt overhang  might be that productive  investment  opportunities  are 
unexploited  because  of  the  illiquidity  problems  caused  by  large  out- 
standing  nominal  debts.  The  illiquidity  problem  arises  because  in  the 
absence  of seniority  clauses,  new  lenders  do not have  any incentive  to 
make loans,  because  their claims  would  be  diluted  alongside  with  the 
old  loans.  Along  the  similar  lines,  it is  often  asserted  that  free-rider 
problems among existing  creditors diminish  the incentives  of these cred- 
itors to make any new  loans. 
The  evidence  presented  in  the  paper  suggests  that  neither  of  the 
above  two  reasons  is  likely  to be  very  important.  While  rescheduling 
countries  appear  to  have  suffered  from  a  slowdown  in  productivity 
growth,  indebtedness  does  not appear to explain the slowdown.  Access 
to financial markets does  not seem  to have enhanced  investment  either. 
Consequently  one might advise  debtors to "leave the private debt hang- 
ing."  See Bulow  and Rogoff  (1990). 
Cohen posits  a solution  to the debt problem where  the creditor banks 
commit  to allowing  the countries  to repurchase  their debt,  after giving 
them the opportunity  to accumulate  reserves,  at prices agreed  upon  ex 
ante. Yet this solution  is extremely  difficult  to implement  in practice. It 
supposes  that the banks,  on their own,  will be able to resolve  free-rider 
problems and make a credible commitment  to let the countries  purchase 
their debt at the right price. 
The International  Financial Institutions'  (IFI) role in debt  restructur- 
ings,  such  as  in  the  Brady  plans,  are a response  to  such  difficulties. 
Typical elements  of such  plans  and the functions  that they  serve can be 
summarized  as  follows:  See  Diwan  and  Rodrik (1992). IFIs make  new 
loans  to countries,  in part, to accommodate  adjustment  programs  that 
countries  commit  to undertake,  which  have  high  initial costs.  In addi- 
tion,  loans  from IFIs allow  countries  to purchase  part of the  debt  out- 
standing  from their commercial  creditors.  In these  arrangements,  banks 
typically agree to sell a quantity of outstanding  debt at a particular price, 
and make  some  new  lending. 
The parameters  of these  agreements,  the amount  of new  loans made, 
the  relative  shares  of banks  and  IFIs in the  new  loans,  the  amount  of 
the debt retired, and the price at which  it is retired determine  the burden 
sharing among  different classes  of lenders  and the borrower.  The menu 
approach  of recent  agreements  provides  banks  with  an opportunity  to 
select  from  a  set  of  options  according  to  their  own  valuation,  hence 
combining  market elements  with  concerted  mechanisms. Comment ? 111 
The IFIs play a crucial role by monitoring  the borrowers'  adjustment 
efforts,  for  which  they  are  better  equipped  than  individual  private 
banks.  The IFIs' better capacity to undertake  such  monitoring  is due  to 
a number of factors, such as their experience  with countries,  their supe- 
rior access to information,  and the greater political acceptability of moni- 
toring by IFIs as opposed  to private commercial  banks. 
Whether  the IFI loans  are senior  to loans  from private lenders  or not 
has  important  implications  for debt  settlement  packages  as well  as for 
the  potential  role  IFIs might  play  in  the  ongoing  reforms  of  Eastern 
Europe and the republics  of the former Soviet  Union.1 Cohen  does  not 
find evidence  of seniority  effects  (for which  I believe  he has used  1989 
data as I infer inspecting  Table 1). To have  a cursory look at the impact 
of official debt  on  discounts  in the  secondary  market I have  estimated 
the following  regression.2  (The numbers  in parentheses  are t values.) 
Log (discount)  =  3.99  +  .003 dexp  +  .009 rimp  -  .54 rgnp  -  .02 inf 
(5.23)  (3.21)  (.79)  (-2.17)  (-2.41) 
.15y87  +  .51y88  +  .14spr  -  3.54 offc 
(.60)  (1.98)  (3.26)  (-4.03) 
R sqr  =  0.7 
Adj. Rsqr =  0.6 
where  discount  =  100  -  bidprice,  dexp  =  debt  /exports,  rimp  =  re- 
serves/imports,  rgnp  =  real GNP per capita, inf  =  rate of inflation,  spr 
=  spread between  bid and ask prices,  offc  =  share of official debt (total 
multilateral and bilateral) in total debt, y87 and y88 are dummy  variables 
for 1987 and  1988, respectively. 
The previous  results suggest  that official debt is senior to private debt. 
There  are  several  reasons  for  the  contrast  between  these  results  and 
Cohen's.  First, Cohen  considers  1989; the above  regression  is for 1986- 
1988. Second,  Cohen  looks  at IFI debt,  which  must  be the  multilateral 
debt category,  whereas  I look at total official debt. Finally, the equations 
are somewhat  differently  specified. 
The contrast between  the  previous  regression  and  the  analogous  re- 
1. For a recent study of the role of IFIs in the East, see Bulow and Rogoff (1992). The 
authors provide a wealth of evidence that challenges the IFI  seniority hypothesis. 
2. The data are annual for the 1986-1988 period and include Argentina, Brazil,  Mexico, 
Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador,  Morocco, Philippines, Turkey, Zaire, and the 
Ivory  Coast. The annual values are obtained  from the quarterly  data used in Ozler and 
Huizinga (1991).  The countries are the subset of countries Cohen uses, which are also 
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gression  in Cohen's  paper  suggests  a more careful consideration  of the 
evidence  on  seniority  is needed. 
Cohen's  study  addresses  a number  of very  important  issues  empiri- 
cally,  providing  a "first pass"  at them  and  pointing  to the  importance 
of further and more detailed  investigations.  Cohen's  regression  analysis 
does not provide evidence  indicating  that various measures  of indebted- 
ness  affect growth.  Yet it may  be  that indebtedness  interacts with  the 
political and institutional  climate in the country.  In more polarized  and 
politically unstable  countries,  higher  levels  of external debt,  and strug- 
gle over burden  sharing  may reduce  growth.  If so,  this effect could  be 
detected  by  regressing  growth  on  indebtedness  interacted  with  mea- 
sures of these  other variables.3 
I question  Cohen's  claim  that  there  are no  substitutes  for domestic 
savings,  which  he  bases  on  regressions  of  domestic  investment  and 
availability of foreign  finance.  There are numerous  historical examples 
that point  to the benefits  of international  financial integration  in devel- 
opment  process,  while  the importance  of the relative timing  of integra- 
tion and other macro and international  policies  is well  known. 
In  sum,  while  I do  not  agree  with  all the  views  expressed  in  this 
paper,  which  require  considerably  more  empirical  support,  the  paper 
provides  a stimulating  and important  overview  of many  major issues. 
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Discussion 
Stan Fischer argued  that in determining  the  beneficiaries  of the  Brady 
Plan, the secondary  market prices for debt are essentially  useless.  Mar- 
ket participants  certainly  anticipated  that some  kind  of settlement  was 
going  to  occur well  before  the  Brady Plan  was  announced.  Thus,  the 
only information  gained  from examining  movements  in secondary  mar- 
ket prices is whether  the settlement  was  more or less  generous  to debt- 
holders  than was  expected. 
Alan  Stockman  suggested  that  additional  theoretical  work  on  the 
question  of  why  did  the  debtor  countries  repay  their  debt  would  be 
useful.  For example,  understanding  how  reputation,  the imposition  of 
sanctions,  and the  possibilities  of negotiation  are interrelated  is crucial 
for evaluating  the genesis  and the effects  of the Brady Plan. 
On this issue,  Bill English noted  that Cohen assumes  a discount  factor 
of only  .85. This value  seems  low,  suggesting  that Cohen  overstates  the 
amount  that countries  are willing  to pay  to avoid  the  default  penalty. 
In addition,  English  argued  that,  based  on  the  Bulow  and  Rogoff JPE 
paper,  the  default  penalty  imposed  by  creditors  is  likely  to  be  more 
substantial  than Cohen  assumes. 
Olivier Blanchard questioned  the use  in debt settlements  of the mar- 
ginal price of debt  as opposed  to the  average  price.  From the  point  of 
view  of  the  debtor  countries,  the  marginal  price  is  clearly preferable. 
However,  from the point  of view  of society,  this may not be the correct 
price, because  the discrepancy  between  the marginal price and the aver- 
age  price arises  from behavior  on  the  part of the  debtor countries  that 
we  may not want  to validate. 
Herschel Grossman  remarked that one must be careful when  drawing 
inference  from the countries  that have  defaulted  on their debt without 
experiencing  a  systematic  worsening  in  the  terms  at which  they  can 
borrow in the future.  To the  extent  that these  defaults  are the result of 
crisis situations  and  are in  some  sense  "excusable,"  their  subsequent 
treatment cannot be interpreted  as the penalty  for outright repudiation. 
Stan Fischer noted  that one  of the  significant  lessons  of the  debt crisis 
is  the  importance  attached  by  the  debtor  countries  to  being  in  good 
standing  with  the  international  agencies  and  the  international  capital 
markets. 
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markets. 114 . DISCUSSION 
Michael  Gavin  observed  that  looking  only  at  the  residuals  of  the 
growth equation  in order to gauge  the effect of the debt crisis on growth 
may be misleading.  A substantial  part of the  effect may work  through 
the  other right-hand  side  variables,  such  as terms  of trade.  Citing  the 
large drop  in  the  ratio of investment  to  GDP  for Mexico  from 27% in 
1981 to  16% in  1982,  Gavin  questioned  the  notion  that  the  debt  crisis 
had  little  effect  on  investment.  Responding  to  the  first point,  Cohen 
argued  that in principle  this  is correct, but in fact these  effects  are not 
that  important  for  the  debt  crisis.  Stan  Fischer  remarked  that  these 
growth  regressions  must be interpreted  cautiously  because  there is tre- 
mendous  endogeneity  in the first place in terms of which  countries  got 
into the debt crisis. 